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I. INTRODUCTION
"Personally I think that the entire body of law in this area is outra-
geous, but it is clear that peremptory challenges no longer exist. "I
The peremptory challenge has been the subject of numerous state
and federal court decisions since 1986, when the United States Supreme
Court subjected it to equal protection analysis in Batson v. Kentucky.'
* Instructor, University of Miami School of Law. Summer research grants from the
University of Miami School of Law supported the writing of this article.
** Instructor, University of Miami School of Law. The authors would like to thank Irwin
Stotzky for his support and inspiration in the writing of this article.
1. State v. Franqui, 699 So. 2d 1332, 1341 (Fla. 1997) (Harding, J., dissenting) (quoting
Sorondo, J.).
2. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
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Before Batson, litigants used peremptory challenges to strike a predeter-
mined number of potential jurors based upon arbitrary, "seat of the
pants" instincts.3 Challenges could be made for any reason at all, and
litigants were not required to offer explanations.4 Batson dramatically
affected the jury selection process, as it prevented litigants from exercis-
ing peremptory challenges on the basis of race, and it required them to
formulate race-neutral justifications for the strike.5 The Supreme Court
subsequently expanded Batson's protections to classifications such as
ethnicity6 and gender.7 Challenges directed against those groups also
require neutral, non-pretextual explanations to withstand equal protec-
tion scrutiny. If a court determines that an attorney's proffered explana-
tions for a peremptory strike are not credible, the strike will be
disallowed.'
The peremptory challenge has resulted in confusion among state
and federal courts in determining which groups are protected from its
nondiscriminatory application. 9 Litigants' explanations for their use of
peremptories frequently require trial courts to assess their credibility
through extensive questioning. In 1995, The Supreme Court announced
in Purkett v. Elem' ° that litigants may proffer any "facially valid" reason
for the strike, which the trial court must assess as credible." This hold-
ing has resulted in conflicts between federal courts as to what constitute
acceptable, non-pretextual justifications for the peremptory. 2
Prior to Batson, courts were reluctant to inquire into the basis of the
peremptory challenge because of its inherently selective nature, reason-
3. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965), overruled by Batson v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. 79 (1986).
4. See Swain, 380 U.S. at 220.
5. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 97.
6. See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991).
7. See J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 143 (1994) (stating that Batson's scope may not
extend to groups normally subject to rational basis review). J.E.B. left open the question
regarding Batson's extension to classifications satisfying heightened scrutiny. See id. at 135-42.
For example, in addition to race, gender, and national origin, religion may be a protected
classification under Batson. See United States v. Somerstein, 959 F. Supp. 592 (E.D.N.Y. 1997)
and discussion infra Part HI.A.
8. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-98 (formulating a three-step inquiry to assess whether the
peremptory challenge violated the defendant's equal protection rights); Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S.
765, 768 (1995).
9. See Kenneth Melilli, Batson in Practice: What We Have Learned About Batson and
Peremptory Challenges, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 470 (1996) ("[Tihe data suggests that the
criteria used by the courts in measuring both the existence of a prima facie case and the adequacy
of proffered explanations is by no means uniform.") See also infra notes 85-104 and
accompanying text.
10. 514 U.S. 765 (1995).
11. Id. at 768.
12. See Melilli, supra note 9, at 466-70; see also infra notes 136-54 and accompanying text.
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ing that to protect particular groups at the expense of others would itself
be discriminatory.' 3 The Batson Court sought to remedy a history of
discriminatory practices that had systematically excluded racial groups
from jury service, and, in so doing, to protect the integrity of the judicial
process.14
The current peremptory challenge attempts to preserve the constitu-
tional guarantees of equal protection and of an impartial trial.' 5 How-
ever, it also results in mini-hearings and potential appeals on each strike,
and its efficacy in successfully predicting jurors' tendencies is highly
questionable. ' 6 Because the strike is designed to eliminate jurors whose
hidden biases would affect their assessment of the evidence, the strike's
failure to adequately predict jurors' responses supports its abolition. The
benefits of the current peremptory challenge system are strongly out-
weighed by its damage to the jury selection process and corruption of
the judicial system.
Part II of this article examines the history of the peremptory chal-
lenge and the rationales justifying its use prior to the Batson decision.
Part IIIA examines the confusion that Batson and its progeny have cre-
ated in state and federal courts in establishing which classes of jurors are
subject to constitutional protection from the discriminatory use of the
challenge. Part IIIB examines the conflict in federal courts in determin-
ing whether litigants' justifications for using the challenge are nondis-
criminatory or pretextual. It concludes that the Supreme Court's decision
in Purkett v. Elem has resulted in a morass of inconsistencies in deter-
mining whether litigants' use of the strike is discriminatory. Part IVA
addresses how Florida courts, in attempting to provide greater constitu-
tional protection to parties and jurors than federal courts, have function-
ally eliminated the strike as a method of nondiscriminatory jury
selection. Part IVB illustrates the difficulties in constitutionally exercis-
ing the strike in Florida, thereby supporting the challenge's abolition.
Finally, Part V explores alternatives to the peremptory challenge in
its current form, including the viability of returning the challenge to its
original, pre-Batson form, of creating a new type of "quasi-cause" chal-
lenge, or of eliminating the peremptory challenge altogether. This article
joins the many critical works that support the challenge's aboiition 7 due
13. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 221 (1965).
14. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 99.
15. See id. at 97.
16. See Kramer et al., On the Effectiveness of Voir Dire in Criminal Cases with Prejudicial
Pretrial Publicity: An Empirical Study, 40 AM. U. L. REv. 665, 668 (1991) ("[T]here is little
evidence that attorneys' peremptory challenges are reliably related to jurors' verdict preferences");
see also infra notes 242-64 and accompanying text.
17. See, e.g., Lisa Lee Mancini Hayden, Recent Case, The End of the Peremptory Challenge?
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to its history of discriminatory use, its unworkability if converted to a
revised or "quasi-cause" form, and its inaccuracy in selecting a
favorable jury.
II. HISTORY OF THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE
While the Constitution does not confer a right to peremptory chal-
lenges, they originally arose as a means to select a qualified and unbi-
ased jury. 8 The peremptory challenge is "a practice of ancient origin"
and is "part of our common law heritage."19 It has been in practice for
nearly as long as juries have existed.20
In the years following the Norman Conquest, the jury existed as an
inquisitorial device from which the English Crown had the right to select
the most informed witnesses. 21 By the end of the thirteenth century,
jurors were generally knights selected by the king who acted both as
grand jurors and as petit jurors.22 The Crown subsequently began exer-
cising unlimited peremptory challenges in capital cases, while the
defendant was entitled to only thirty-five.23 The early English peremp-
tory challenge may have been a variant of the challenge for cause, as it
was generally practiced in small English villages and towns, where peo-
ple knew each other well enough to recognize certain jurors' obvious
The Implications of J.E.B. for Jury Service in Alabama, 47 ALA. L. REV. 243, 261 (1995)
(contending that the labyrinthine methods of articulating neutral reasons for its application
effectively collapses the peremptory into a challenge for cause); Melilli, supra note 9, at 502
(concluding that it no longer serves a useful purpose); Patricia J. Griffin, Jumping On the Band
Wagon: Minetos v. City University of New York and the Future of the Peremptory Challenge, 81
MINN. L. REv. 1237, 1239 (1997); Morris B. Hoffman, Peremptory Challenges Should Be
Abolished: A Trial Judge's Perspective, 64 U. CHI. L. Rav. 809 (1997).
18. See Raymond J. Broderick, Why the Peremptory Challenge Should be Abolished, 65
TEMP. L. REv. 369, 374 (1992). The Supreme Court has held that the peremptory challenge is not
constitutionally required; thus, its abolition would not per se violate the constitutional fight to an
impartial jury. See Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 88 (1988).
19. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 639 (1991) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
20. The Romans used peremptories in civil cases, as reflected in the Lex Servilia. See J.
PETTINGAL, AN ENQUIRY INTO THE USE AND PRACTICE OF JuRms AMONG THE GREEKS AND
ROMANS 115, 135 (1769). The Roman jurors originated as "Judices" who were called from the
Senate to serve as prospective jurors in Senatorial trials that year. See Hoffman, supra note 17, at
814. Eighty-one senators would be selected by lot for any particular trial, and then each litigant
could challenge fifteen prospective jurors. Id. Apart from the Roman Judices and Athenian juries
or "dikasteria," ancient juries served primarily as investigative bodies and witnesses for suspected
criminal activities. Id. at 815.
21. See WALLACE D. LOH, SOCIAL RESEARCH IN THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, CASES, READINGS,
AND TEXT 386 (1984).
22. See Hoffman, supra note 17, at 818. The Magna Carta also did not guarantee a right to a
jury, but Pope Innocent Ill's ban on trials by ordeal left trial by jury as the only alternative after
1219 for deciding serious criminal cases. Id. at 818, 819. The English jury system began to thrive
after this ban. Id. at 819.
23. See id. at 819-20.
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biases.2,
Parliament abrogated the Crown's right to unlimited peremptory
challenges in 1305 by the "Ordinance of Inquests," which obligated the
Crown to show cause for every challenge.25 Since that time in England,
the prosecution has not had the right to use peremptory challenges.26
The peremptory challenge subsequently became established in England
solely as a right of the defendant in felony trials.27 It was defined as "an
arbitrary and capricious species of challenge to a certain number of
jurors, without showing any cause at all."' 28 The number of peremptories
allowed in English criminal trials decreased over the centuries, and in
1989 Parliament abolished them as a method of jury selection.29
The British peremptory challenge carried over to the early Ameri-
can colonies, and it was subsequently incorporated in all the states.3°
Following the English method, most states were slow to recognize the
challenge as a right of the prosecution and regarded it as a shield for the
defendant against conviction-prone jurors. 3  New York and Virginia,
two of the most populous states at the time, did not allow the prosecutor
to use peremptories until 1881 and 1919, respectively.32 Although the
Constitution does not confer a right to use the peremptory challenge,33
for over one hundred years, the United States Supreme Court has recog-
24. See id. at 820.
25. See LoH, supra note 21, at 386.
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *353.
29. See Hoffman, supra note 17, at 822 (citing The Criminal Justice Act, 1988, ch. 33,
§ 118(l)(Eng.)).
30. See Broderick, supra note 18, at 374.
31. See LOH, supra note 21, at 386. The colonial courts also disagreed on the number of
peremptory challenges allowed to the prosecution. "Some colonies permitted an unlimited
number of prosecution peremptories, others allowed none." Hoffman, supra note 17, at 823.
32. See Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 518 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
33. Article III, § 2 of the Constitution provides:
The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by jury; and such
Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed;
but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places
as the Congress may by Law have directed.
U.S. CONST. art III, § 2, cl. 3. The Sixth Amendment provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the wit-
nesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
U.S. CoNsr. amend VI. The Constitution is silent about peremptory challenges, although at least
one draft of the Sixth Amendment provided that a defendant had a right to challenges for cause.
See Hoffman, supra note 17, at 824 (citing VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY
37 (1986)).
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nized the peremptory challenge as a significant means to an impartial
jury.3 4 Federal guidelines governing the exercise of peremptory and for-
cause challenges reflect the historical restriction of the peremptory to a
specific number of strikes - a restriction that is not placed upon the
challenge for cause."
The discriminatory reality of the historical use of the peremptory
strike is reflected by its efficacy after the Civil War in eliminating Afri-
can-American prospective jurors. 36  Restrictive laws on voting rights
and, therefore, juror qualifications were implemented in many states,37
resulting in the discriminatory use of the peremptory to prevent African-
Americans from serving on the petit jury when selective qualification
requirements failed to eliminate them from the venire.38 The peremptory
allowed attorneys to bar African-Americans regularly from sitting on
juries in the South.39
Restrictive statutes on juror qualifications similarly prevented
34. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 633 (1991) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) ("The peremptory challenge fosters both the perception and reality of an impartial
trial.");
The tradition of peremptory challenges for both the prosecution and the accused was
already venerable at the time of Blackstone, ... was reflected in a federal statute by
the same Congress that enacted the Bill of Rights... was recognized in an opinion
by Justice Story to be part of the common law of the United States ... and has
endured through two centuries in all the States . . . The constitutional phrase
"impartial jury" must surely take its content from this unbroken tradition.
Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 481 (1990) (citations and footnotes omitted); Swain v. Alabama,
380 U.S. 202, 211 (1965); Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 373 (1892).
35. For example, see 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (1998), which states:
In civil cases, each party shall be entitled to three peremptory challenges.
Several defendants or several plaintiffs may be considered as a single party for the
purposes of making challenges, or the court may allow additional peremptory
challenges and permit them to be exercised separately or jointly.
All exercises for cause or favor, whether to the array or panel or to individual
jurors, shall be determined by the court.
See also FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b), which states:
If the offense charged is punishable by death, each side is entitled to 20 peremptory
challenges. If the offense charged is punishable by imprisonment for more than one
year, the government is entitled to 6 peremptory challenges and the defendant or
defendants jointly to 10 peremptory challenges. If the offense charged is punishable
by imprisonment for not more than one year or by fine or both, each side is entitled
to 3 peremptory challenges. ...
36. See Hoffman, supra note 17, at 827-28.
37. See id. For example, "[B]lack citizens in antebellum New York could vote, and therefore
serve on a jury, only if they owned at least $250 worth of property. No such requirement applied
to whites." Id. at 871 (citing RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V.
BOARD OFEDIICATON AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 32 (1977)).
38. See id.
39. See Hoffman, supra note 17, at 828-30; see also Swain v. State, 156 So. 2d 368, 375 (Ala.
1963), aff'd, Swain v.Alabama, 380 U.S. 212 (1965) ("Negroes are commonly on venires but are
always struck by attorneys in selecting the trial jury.").
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women from serving on grand and petit juries from the seventeenth cen-
tury to the 1970s 0 ° The prohibition of women from juries was derived
from the English common law, which allowed exclusion due to "propter
defectum sexus," the "defect of sex."41 Women were often thought to be
too fragile for the "polluted courtroom atmosphere, 42 and many states
excluded them from jury service despite the ratification of the Nine-
teenth Amendment in 1920.13 By 1975, five states provided an auto-
matic exemption from jury service for any woman requesting it, and
women were regularly underrepresented on venires." As a result, the
peremptory challenge operated as a second device for the deliberate
exclusion of female veniremembers when the statutory exemptions
failed.45
Despite evidence of its discriminatory use in particular cases, courts
were reluctant to inquire into the basis of the peremptory strike because
of its reliance on inarticulate hunches.46 As the Supreme Court stated in
Swain v. Alabama,47 "To subject the prosecutor's challenge in any par-
ticular case to the demands and traditional standards of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause would entail a radical change in the nature and operation of
40. See People v. Irizarry, 536 N.Y.S.2d 630, 633 (1988), rev'd, 560 N.Y.S.2d 279 (1990)
(observing that New York's Charter of Liberties and Privileges of 1683 directed a "jury of twelve
men" and that "the history of the jury system in New York from 1683 through 1937 finds women
precluded from being jurors"); see also Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 523-24 (1975) (finding
that under the Louisiana system, a woman could not serve on a jury unless she filed a written
declaration of her willingness to do so, and that although 53% of the persons eligible for jury
service were women, less than 1% of the 1,800 persons whose names were drawn from the jury
wheel during a single year were women).
41. J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 132 (1994) (quoting 2 WLLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES .#362).
42. Id.
43. See id. at 131.
44. See Duren v, Missouri, 439 U.S. 355, 359-60 (1979) (summarizing the statutory
provisions enacted by the states in the previous twenty years to exclude women from jury service
by allowing for voluntary exemptions or exemptions for "good cause shown," resulting in their
underrepresentation on venires).
45. See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 135-40 (recognizing that women had historically been
peremptorily stricken based on state-sponsored group stereotypes, and "while the prejudicial
attitudes toward women in this country have not been identical to those held toward racial
minorities, the similarities . . . in some contexts 'overpower those differences'") (citations
omitted); see also Melilli, supra note 9, at 456. Professor Melilli examined the published decisions
of federal and state courts between 1986 and 1993, after Batson but before J.E.B. was decided,
and found that 54% of peremptorily stricken women were successful in establishing a prima facie
case of discrimination, although only 30% were successful in establishing a Batson violation. Id.
at 463. He accounts for the discrepancy by noting that women were unlikely at that time to
constitute a minority of the venire, so strikes against them would appear less suspicious. Id. at
465.
46. See, e.g., State v. Thompson, 206 P.2d 1037, 1039 (Ariz. 1949) (the "challenge is an
arbitrary and capricious species.., it is not essential.. .that any bias or prejudice.., be shown.");
Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 378 (1892).
47. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
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the challenge. 48 The Swain Court also reasoned that all prospective
jurors, regardless of their race or ethnicity, were subject equally to the
peremptory challenge. Thus, to protect certain groups from exclusion by
the strike while exposing other groups would be discriminatory in
itself.49 In order to establish a discriminatory use of the strike that vio-
lated the Equal Protection Clause, the Swain Court required a defendant
to demonstrate that the prosecutor had systematically, in case after case,
used peremptories to exclude African-American jurors.5
A number of courts following Swain held that a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause could be established by proof of repeated strik-
ing of African-Americans over a number of cases.5 ' The burden of
proof to establish this systematic exclusion was crippling.52 The defend-
ant would have to investigate the race of the persons tried in the particu-
lar jurisdiction over a number of cases, the racial composition of the
venire and the final jury, and both parties' manner of exercising the
challenge.53
The Batson Court subsequently found that the "hunches" behind
the strike could be, and often were, a pretext for the exclusion of persons
due to constitutionally impermissible prejudice. 4 The arbitrary aspect
of the challenge also could increase the potential for abuse.55 Because it
found prejudicially employed strikes to be repugnant to the ideals of a
nondiscriminatory adversarial system, the Batson Court required a
48. Id. at 221. The Court added, with much foresight,
The challenge, pro tanto, would no longer be peremptory, each and every challenge
being open to examination, either at the time of the challenge or at a hearing
afterwards. The prosecutor's judgment underlying each challenge would be subject
to scrutiny for reasonableness and sincerity. And a great many uses of the challenge
would be banned.
Id.
49. Id. at 220. This view has currently been resurrected. See Coburn R. Beck, Note, The
Current State of the Peremptory Challenge, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 961, 999 (1998) ("Whereas
wholesale discrimination against any group offends the Equal Protection Clause... [p]rotecting
certain groups of people from being excluded by a peremptory when every other group is exposed
to exclusion is discriminatory in itself.").
50. Swain, 380 U.S. at 227. The Court held that the defendant had not met his burden in
establishing systematic discrimination, even though no African-American had served on a jury in
Swain's Tallageda County since about 1950. Id. at 226.
51. See, e.g., United States v. Jenkins, 701 F.2d 850, 859-60 (10th Cir. 1983); United States v.
Pearson, 448 F.2d 1207 (5th Cir. 1971).
52. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
53. Id. at 93 n.17 (observing that "in jurisdictions where court records do not reflect the
jurors' race and where voir dire proceedings are not transcribed, the burden would be
insurmountable").
54. Id. at 98 ("[T]he reality of practice.., amply shows that the challenge ... unfortunately
at times has been used to discriminate against black jurors.").
55. See id. at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring).
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showing that the strike was employed in an unbiased manner 6.5  It thus
inquired into the basis of the strike. As the following decisions demon-
strate, Batson and its progeny have resulted in the functional elimination
of the peremptory challenge.
IIl. THE U.S. SUPREME COURT AND FEDERAL DECISIONS
The United States Supreme Court in Batson overruled Swain and
held that racial discrimination in jury selection violated both the defend-
ant's and excluded juror's rights under the Equal Protection Clause.57
The Batson prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to strike all four
African-American persons on the venire.58 The Court held that the race-
based challenges violated the defendant's equal protection rights by dis-
torting the impartiality of the jury process. They also violated the equal
protection rights of the excluded jurors by denying them participation in
jury service.59 The Court also recognized that discriminatory challenges
adversely affected the "entire community" because they undermined
confidence in the fairness of the judicial system.6 °
The Court formulated a three-step inquiry to establish the nondis-
criminatory use of the challenged strike. First, the defendant has the
burden of proof to show that he is a member of a "cognizable racial
group" and that the prosecutor exercised his challenges on account of
race.6" The burden then shifts to the prosecution to state a racially neu-
tral explanation for striking the juror in question.62 Finally, the trial
court must determine whether the defendant has carried his burden of
proving purposeful discrimination.63
Justice Marshall, in his concurrence, urged that the peremptory
challenge should be abolished from the criminal justice system because
of its inherent potential for invidious discrimination.' He observed that
the peremptory had been flagrantly misused and that particular case-by-
56. Id. at 96-98.
57. Id. at 97-98.
58. See id. at 83.
59. Id. at 97-98.
60. Id. at 87.
61. See id. at 96. For example, a pattern of strikes against African-American jurors in a
particular venire, or the prosecutor's questions during voir dire may refute or support an inference
of discriminatory purpose. Id.
62. See id. at 97-98. The mere denial of a discriminatory motive would not be enough. Id. The
prosecutor must give a "clear and reasonably specific" explanation of his "legitimate reasons" for
exercising the challenge. See id. at 78.n.20 (quoting Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine,
450 U.S. 248, 258 (1981)). The Supreme Court relaxed the second part of the Batson inquiry in
Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765 (1995), discussed infra Part III.B.
63. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 98.
64. Id. at 107.
2000]
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case inquiries into its basis would be insufficient to unmask racism.6 5
Foreseeing the difficult burden judges would assume in assessing prose-
cutors' justifications for the strike, he stated, "A prosecutor's own con-
scious or unconscious racism may lead him easily to the conclusion that
a prospective black juror is 'sullen' or 'distant,'. . . A judge's own con-
scious or unconscious racism may lead him to accept such an explana-
tion as well supported."66  Justice Marshall concluded that the
peremptory challenge could be eliminated without impairing the consti-
tutional guarantees of an impartial jury and fair trial, because its discrim-
inatory potential was so severe as to distort those guarantees. 67
The Supreme Court continued to extend Batson's ambit by concen-
trating on the rights of jurors to participate in the jury process. In Powers
v. Ohio,68 the Court held that the opponent of a strike need not be of the
same race as the excluded juror. It reasoned that "[a]ctive discrimination
by a prosecutor during [the jury selection] process condones violations
of the United States Constitution within the very institution entrusted
with its enforcement .... ,,69 Although the white criminal defendant in
Powers had not himself been denied equal protection, the Court held that
he had third-party standing to challenge the denial of equal protection to
seven stricken African-American jurors.7 °
While Batson and Powers addressed the use of peremptory chal-
lenges in the criminal context, the Supreme Court extended Batson scru-
tiny to civil cases in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.71 It found that
civil litigants constitute state actors, and that discriminatory exercises of
peremptory challenges have the same effect on prospective jurors in the
civil context as they do in the criminal context.72
A. Protected Groups After Batson
The Supreme Court later expanded Batson's protections to include
ethnicity73 and gender.74 This expansion resulted in speculation as to
whether Batson applied to other classes receiving heightened scrutiny.7 5
Hernandez v. New York involved the peremptory challenges of two pro-
spective bilingual Hispanic jurors because of their lack of proficiency in
65. Id. at 103-06.
66. Id. at 106.
67. Id. at 107.
68. 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
69. Id. at 412.
70. Id. at 415.
71. 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
72. Id. at 631.
73. See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991).
74. See J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
75. See infra notes 97-105 and accompanying text.
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English. The Court determined that "for certain ethnic groups and for
some communities, proficiency in a particular language, like skin color,
should be treated as a surrogate for race under an equal protection
analysis. 76
The Court was persuaded by the prosecutor's explanation that the
challenges rested neither on stereotypical assumptions about Hispanics
nor on an intention to exclude Hispanic or bilingual jurors.77 It found
the prosecutor's explanation for the strike to be race-neutral because it
rested on the jurors' ability to accept the translator's rendition of Span-
ish-language testimony as the final arbiter of the witnesses' responses.78
Although the Court affirmed the defendant's conviction, it warned, "[A]
policy of striking all who speak a given language, without regard to the
particular circumstances of the trial or the individual responses of the
jurors, may be found by the trial judge to be a pretext for
discrimination."79
The Court similarly prohibited gender-based peremptory strikes in
J.E.B. v. Alabama.80 In J.E.B. the State used nine of its ten peremptory
strikes to remove male jurors, resulting in an all-female jury in a pater-
nity suit. The State reasoned that men "might be more sympathetic and
receptive" 81 to the arguments of a male defendant. The Court rejected
this distinction as resting on invidious, "state-sponsored group stereo-
types"82 that violated the equal protection rights of potential jurors.
Although it recognized that women, unlike African-Americans, are not a
numerical minority,83 the Court sought to avoid creating the impression
that the judicial system "suppress[ed] full participation by one gen-
der."84 The Court thus continued its shift of focus from the defendant's
equal protection rights to the rights of the excluded jurors and the judi-
cial system's integrity.8" Foreseeing the scope of its decision, the Court
stated that its holding did not imply the elimination of all peremptory
76. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 371.
77. See id. at 361.
78. Id. Justice Stevens, in his dissent, stated that if the prosecutor's concern was "valid and
substantiated by the record, it would have supported a challenge for cause." Id. at 379. He
contended that the prosecutor's failure to make a for-cause challenge should have disqualified him
from advancing that concern as a justification for the peremptory. See id. The majority disagreed,
stating, "While the reason offered by the prosecutor for a peremptory strike need not rise to the
level of a challenge for cause... the fact that it corresponds to a valid for-cause challenge will
demonstrate its race-neutral character." Id. at 362-63.
79. Id. at 371-72.
80. 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
81. Id. at 138.
82. Id. at 146.
83. id. at 136.
84. Id. at 140.
85. Id.
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challenges: "[p]arties still may remove jurors who they feel might be
less acceptable than others on the panel; gender simply may not serve as
a proxy for bias." 86
Federal and state courts subsequently have expanded the definition
of a "cognizable racial group" to include both race and ethnic affiliation,
such as Italian-Americans,87 Native-Americans,88 and Asian-Ameri-
cans. 8  However, federal courts have rejected certain groups as being
cognizable and distinct, such as city residents, 90 young adults and col-
lege students, 91 non-registered voters, 92 blue-collar workers,93 young
adults,94 and "less-educated persons."95 The J.E.B. Court was careful to
note that parties may exercise their peremptory challenges to remove
from the venire "any group or class of individuals normally subject to
'rational basis' review. '"96 Therefore, the scope of the Court's decisions
generally has been limited to racial, ethnic, and gender-based strikes,
although their extension to classifications or characteristics that would
satisfy heightened scrutiny remains an open question.97
Batson and J.E.B. may be seen as attempts to wipe out the remnants
of widespread, historical, discriminatory practices. Because there is no
86. Id. at 143.
87. See United States v. Biaggi, 853 F.2d 89, 95 (2d Cir. 1988) (Italian-Americans "share a
common experience and culture, often share the same religious and culinary practices, often have
commonly identifiable surnames, and have been subject to stereotyping."). But see United States
v. Bucci, 839 F.2d 825, 833 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding that the ethnic group in question must be
subject to discriminatory treatment before it can qualify as a "cognizable group").
88. See United States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302 (10th Cir. 1987).
89. See United States v. Sneed, 34 F.3d 1570 (10th Cir. 1994).
90. See United States v. Canfield, 879 F.2d 446 (8th Cir. 1989). The Court in J.E.B. v.
Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 134 (1994), noted that the Sixth Amendment principles applied in Taylor
v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975), in determining which groups are distinct for fair cross-section
purposes, are "consistent with the heightened equal protection scrutiny afforded gender-based
classifications."
91. See Ford v. Seabold, 841 F.2d 677 (6th Cir. 1988).
92. See United States v. Afflerbach, 754 F.2d 866 (10th Cir. 1985).
93. See Anaya v. Hansen, 781 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1986).
94. See id. at 3.
95. See id.
96. J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 143.
97. See, e.g., Matthew Crehan, The Disability-Based Peremptory Challenge: Does it Validate
Discrimination Against Blind Potential Jurors?, 25 Ky. L. REv. 531, 544 (1998). Judge Crehan
states that "[t]he death knell has not been sounded for peremptory challenges at least in relation to
the disabled," but concludes that it is highly unlikely that the disabled compose a suspect class
entitling them to the same heightened-scrutiny analysis applicable to minorities and women. Id. at
542. He observed that although fifteen states specifically prohibit the exclusion or disqualification
of prospective jurors on the basis of disability, some of them have statutes or rules allowing for a
challenge if the disability would "impair the rendering of satisfactory jury service." Id. at 536; see
also Andrew D. Leipold, Constitutionalizing Jury Selection in Criminal Cases: A Critical
Evaluation, 86 GEO. L. J. 945 (1998) (noting that "it is difficult to explain why gender based
strikes ... are barred by the Equal Protection Clause, but viewpoint discrimination ... is not").
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comparable history of discrimination against many of the groups that
often are subject to peremptory strikes (e.g. "liberals," friends of attor-
neys or police officers, or people recently divorced), the use of such
challenges on them generally would not, absent other protected factors,
trigger the Batson inquiry.98 However, peremptory strikes against white
men also could be prohibited on racial or gender lines,99 even though
there is no comparable history of discrimination. Although current deci-
sions generally have limited the initial Batson inquiry to racial, ethnic,
or gender classifications,"0° equal protection jurisprudence logically
would allow a larger application. As Justices Burger and Rehnquist
stated in their dissenting opinion in Batson:
[I]f conventional equal protection principles apply, then presumably
defendants could object to exclusions on the basis of not only race,
but also sex ... age ... religious or political affiliation ... mental
capacity ... number of children ... living arrangements ... employ-
ment in a particular industry .. .or profession. In short, it is quite
probable that every peremptory challenge could be objected to on the
basis that, because it excluded a venireman who had some character-
istics not shared by the remaining members of the venire, it consti-
tuted a "classification" subject to equal protection scrutiny. 0°
Some courts have included the potential juror's religion in the type
of classification properly subject to Batson scrutiny.102 The Supreme
Court denied certiorari of a decision from the Michigan Supreme Court
in Davis v. Minnesota which allowed the peremptory challenge of a
Jehovah's Witness on religious grounds. 10 3 In denying certiorari, Justice
Ginsburg noted that religious affiliations are not as self-evident as race
or gender and that questions concerning a juror's religious affiliation are
98. See Leipold, supra note 97, at 976.
99. See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 127; Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 62 n.2 (1992) (Thomas,
J., concurring) ("Today, we decide only that white defendants may not strike black veniremen on
the basis of race. Eventually, we will have to decide whether black defendants may strike white
veniremen ... Although ... the issue technically remains open, it is difficult to see how the result
could be different if the defendants here were black.")
100. See Crehan, supra note 97, at 546 ("Ilt appears that the unrestricted peremptory
challenge is alive and well in all but racial and gender strikes and will stay that way for the
foreseeable future.").
101. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (citations omitted).
102. See United States v. Somerstein, 959 F. Supp. 592 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); Joseph v. State, 636
So. 2d 777 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994); State v. Gilmore, 511 A.2d 1150, 1159 n.3 (N.J. 1986) (applying
equal protection analysis to peremptory challenges on the basis of religion, national origin, race,
or gender). The Somerstein court concluded that Jewish panel members could also be classified as
a "race" based on their ancestry or ethnic characteristics, and that "whether persons of the Jewish
faith are considered a religion or a race or both.., the Batson rule does apply." Somerstein, 959
F. Supp. at 595.
103. Davis v. Minnesota, 511 U.S. 1115 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
2000]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
ordinarily improper and prejudicial. 1" However, in his dissent from the
denial of certiorari, Justice Thomas stated, "[G]iven the Court's ration-
ale in J.E.B., no principled reason immediately appears for declining to
apply Batson to any strike based on a classification that is accorded
heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause."' 1 5
In United States v. Somerstein,1° one federal court recently applied
Davis to conclude that the Batson rule would apply to religious classifi-
cations, such as persons of the Jewish faith.1"7 It specified, however,
that in order to uphold such a strike against a Baston challenge, the
juror's religion must be relevant to the issues of the case, and the inquiry
should involve only the juror, and not the juror's family or friends.'0 8
The Somerstein case illustrates the difficulty in challenging jurors
based upon their religious affiliation. In that case, the criminal defend-
ants, kosher caterers, objected to the prosecutor's challenge of one juror,
James Lefkowitz, because of his "quintessential Jewish name" and his
father's position as president of "American Palestine."' 0 9 The court
stated that the defendants satisfied their burden to establish a prima facie
case of religious discrimination in his case.' 10
The court also found that three of the defendants' objections to the
prosecutor's challenges failed to state a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion.Ilt One juror described herself as "Irish/German" and her husband
as "Hebrew, Polish, and Russian;" the court found this description was
insufficient to establish that the juror was of the Jewish faith. 1 2 Another
juror, named Meyer, had "attended kosher catered events." '1 3 The court
noted that many people in the Eastern District of New York had attended
a kosher catered event but were not of the Jewish faith. The defendants
again failed to state a prima facie case of discrimination.' 14 The court
also denied the defendant's objection to a juror who described herself as
"American (German, Lithuanian, Polish)" and whose nephew was Bar
Mitzvahed.' 15 The court stated that either the juror was of Jewish ances-
try, "a highly unlikely supposition, or ... her brother married a Jewish
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1117.
106. 959 F. Supp. 592 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
107. Id. at 595.
108. Id. at 595-96.
109. Id. at 596.
110. Id. However, the prosecutor's justification, that the proposed juror read a book throughout
the entire voir dire, thus demonstrating a lack of interest in the criminal proceeding, was sufficient
to demonstrate a facially valid reason for the challenge. Id. at 597.
111. Id. at 596-97.
112. See id. at 596.





woman. Assuming the latter to be the case, the Court again expresse[s]
its grave doubt that a Batson challenge based on religion could ever be
applied to a panel member's relationship with a third party".116
As Somerstein illustrates, a prima facie case of religious discrimi-
nation based on surname or descent could be greatly misleading as to the
prospective juror's religion. Because Davis implies that direct questions
would be inappropriate to establish a potential juror's religious affilia-
tion, the court is limited by such factors. Although the Somerstein court
was careful to limit its rule to avoid opening a "pandora's box" of fac-
tual disputes and hearings on the issue,1 7 it ultimately had to speculate
as to whether several of the challenged jurors were within the class it
sought to protect. Such speculation further reduces the use of the chal-
lenge to a guessing game, which undermines the integrity of the judicial
process that Batson sought to protect.
A further logical extension of the Batson doctrine would include
applying its protections to jurors' other First Amendment rights. Once
the door is open to protecting jurors' religious freedoms, then their
speech and association freedoms should similarly be protected. 8 The
fact that litigants have generally been free to peremptorily strike jurors
based upon their speech and affiliation implicitly assumes that the
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury, combined with
the government's right to preserve public confidence in the judicial sys-
tem, outweigh the jurors' First Amendment rights.
Professor Andrew Leipold challenges this assumption, contending
that peremptorily striking jurors because of their protected activities
should not withstand strict scrutiny.'1 9 He reasons that the govern-
ment's and the defendant's interests "would fail to tip the balance in
favor of peremptories,"' 2 ° because peremptories are poor predictors of
jurors' decisions and, therefore, are not narrowly tailored to serving the
governmental interests. 2' State and federal courts' willingness to allow
peremptories based upon potential jurors' associations and beliefs also
undermines public confidence in the integrity of the judicial process,
because jurors understandably wonder why such associations justify
116. Id.
117. See id. at 594, 595.
118. See Cheryl G. Bader, Batson Meets the First Amendment: Prohibiting Peremptory
Challenges That Violate a Prospective Juror's Speech and Association Rights, 24 HOFSTRA L.
REv. 567, 616 (1996) ("A prohibition on the exercise of peremptory challenges arising from the
prospective juror's speech and association practices reduces the potential for stigmatizing jurors
and chilling the exercise of such rights, and thereby minimizes the risk of undermining the value
we attach to the First Amendment freedoms.").
119. Leipold, supra note 97, at 981-86.
120. Id. at 982.
121. Id. at 984.
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removal. Excused veniremen leave the courtroom thinking that the trial
process is trivial, because it rests on stereotypical assumptions that their
"liberal" views or membership in associations keep them from properly
assessing the evidence. 22 As a practical matter, the peremptory chal-
lenge would be very difficult to exercise if a prospective juror's beliefs
and association rights were subject to Batson's protections. 123 Litigants
could still question jurors about their beliefs and affiliations to lay the
groundwork for a challenge for cause, but most of the categories that
currently support the use of the strike would be foreclosed.
B. Nondiscriminatory Justifications for the Peremptory Challenge
The Supreme Court in Purkett v. Elem 24 relaxed the second stage
of Batson's burden-shifting analysis, resulting in conflicts among lower
courts as to whether particular justifications in using the challenge could
withstand equal protection scrutiny. The prosecutor in Elem rejected two
prospective African-American jurors because they had mustaches and
goatees, and counsel for the African-American defendant objected.'25
Because the veniremembers satisfied the first step of the Batson test,126
the Court focused on the second part of the analysis - the facial valid-
122. Judge Hoffman, supra note 17, at 861-62, observes,
I cannot count the number of times I have seen prospective jurors flash me a look of
betrayal when, after they have passed through the gauntlet of challenges for cause,
they have been excused peremptorily because of their educational level or their
occupation or the kind of car they drive.
123. See Melilli, supra note 9, 487-98 (listing sixteen reasons that lawyers typically use as a
basis for the peremptory. These reasons include close friends or relatives having prior criminal
activity, employment, marital status, liberal status, religion, membership in an African-American
organization, and reading Rolling Stone magazine). Striking a juror based on his viewpoints about
gun ownership could interfere with his free speech rights, because the government is depriving
him of his right to jury service based on the content of his speech. See generally R.A.V. v. City of
St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). A peremptory strike based upon the juror's marital status could
similarly implicate his privacy and family rights. See Littlejohn v. Rose, 768 F.2d 765, 769 (6th
Cir. 1985) (holding that a public school teacher could not be denied the renewal of employment
because of an impending divorce, as decisions regarding marital status are protected by the right
to privacy). See also Leipold, supra note 97, at 979-80 (listing these rights and additional rights
implicated by peremptory strikes, such as the right to petition the government, when the juror is
stricken based upon his filing a prior lawsuit, and the right of free association, when the juror
belongs to a particular political group). "In each case, the benefit of jury service is denied because
the potential juror has expressed a view; taken an action, or associated with others in a way that a
state actor disfavors." Id. (footnotes omitted).
124. 514 U.S. 765 (1995) (per curiam).
125. See id. at 766.
126. See id. at 767. The state trial judge had initially rejected the defendant's Batson objection
on the ground that the defendant had failed at the first step of the Batson inquiry, but, as Justice
Stevens noted, "Everyone now agrees that finding was incorrect." Id. at 771, 775 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Justices Stevens and Breyer found that the majority opinion "implicitly ratifies the
Court of Appeals' decision to evaluate on its own whether the prosecutor had satisfied step two."
Id. at 776.
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ity of the prosecutor's explanation. While the Batson Court held that the
prosecutor must give clear, specific, and "legitimate reasons for exercis-
ing the challenge," 127 the Purkett Court held that the litigant's explana-
tion for the challenge did not have to be "persuasive, or even plausible,"
for it to be legitimate. 128 A legitimate reason is not one "that makes
sense, but a reason that does not deny equal protection." 129 Unless dis-
criminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor's explanation, the justifi-
cation will be deemed race-neutral. 30
The persuasiveness of the proffered reason is only relevant in the
third part of the analysis. "At that stage, implausible or fantastic justifi-
cations may (and probably will) be found to be pretexts for purposeful
discrimination . . . the ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial
motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the
strike." 13 1 The Court added that, in the third stage, the "whole focus [is
not] upon the reasonableness of the asserted nonracial motive ... [but]
rather . . . the genuineness of the motive . . . a finding which turns
primarily on an assessment of credibility."13 2
The Purkett prosecutor stated that he struck the jurors because of
their "mustache and goatee type beard[s]. Those are the only two people
on the jury ... with the facial hair .... I don't like the way they looked
.... ,,133 The Court stated that this explanation was "race-neutral and
satisfie[d] the prosecution's step two burden of articulating a nondis-
criminatory reason for the strike . . . Thus, the inquiry properly pro-
ceeded to step three, where the state court found that the prosecutor was
not motivated by discriminatory intent."' 34  The Court reversed and
remanded the case because the Court of Appeals had erroneously
focused on the reasonableness, rather than on the genuineness, of the
asserted non-racial motive.135
The Purkett decision has been criticized as furthering hidden dis-
crimination in jury selection, because any reason, plausible or implausi-
ble, would satisfy its second step. 136 Some scholars initially predicted
127. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. at 79 n.20 (1986).
128. Purkett, 514 U.S. at 765.
129. Id. at 769.
130. See id. at 768.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 769.
133. Id. at 766.
134. Id. at 769.
135. Id. at 769-70.
136. See, e.g., Beck, supra note 49, at 996, stating, "[T]he Court may settle for the ... more
discrete method of turning a blind eye towards certain illicit challenges." He also notes that it was
not difficult even under Batson's more stringent test to satisfy the explanation requirement: "one
study of hundreds of lower court cases in the five years following Batson revealed that judges
ruled only a small fraction of prosecutors' neutral explanations to be insufficient and invalid." Id.
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that the decision signaled a retreat from earlier post-Batson jurispru-
dence and a return to a more unfettered use of the challenge.'37 The
practical result has been a conflict among lower courts in determining
whether particular justifications are in fact pretexts for discrimination or
presumptively non-pretextual. 38
For example, striking an African-American venireperson for lack of
"eyeball contact" has been held not to be pretextual, 3 9 but striking an
African American venireperson based on "feelings ... that she would
not be a good juror" was pretextual. 4 ° Striking African-American
venirepersons for lack of business experience and education was not
pretextual,' a l but striking African-American venirepersons for living in
a low-income neighborhood was pretextual.1 42  As a result, the New
York appellate courts have drawn up guidelines to help trial courts apply
Batson's second step. These guidelines include reasons that will be pre-
sumed pretextual and reasons that will be presumed non-pretextual. 43
Minetos v. City University of New York' 44 is illustrative of the
"bedevilling problems associated with peremptory challenges which, by
their very nature, invite corruption of the judicial process."'' 45  In that
case, the plaintiff claimed that the defendants had committed a Batson
error by using three peremptories to exclude two African-Americans and
at 997 n.14 (citing Michael J. Raphael & Edward J. Ungvarsky, Excuses, Excuses: Neutral
Explanations Under Batson v. Kentucky, 27 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 229, 236-37 (1993)).
137. See id. at 996; see also Joan E. Imbriani, Fourteenth Amendment, Section One-Equal
Protection Clause-Prosecution's Explanation for Exercising Peremptory Challenges Need Only
Be Race-Neutral, Not Persuasive or Plausible, Where Intentional Racial Discrimination Is
Alleged, 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 911, 915 (1996).
138. See Melilli, supra note 9, at 470 ("[O]ne has to wonder why, for example, over 68% of
the Batson complainants ultimately prevailed in Florida and only one of the thirty-six ultimately
prevailed in the Eighth Circuit. At the very least, the data suggests that the criteria used by courts
in measuring both the existence of a prima facie case and the adequacy of proffered explanations
is by no means uniform.").
139. See Polk v. Dixie Ins. Co., 972 F.2d 83, 85 (5th Cir. 1992).
140. See Splunge v. Clark, 960 F.2d 705, 708-09 (7th Cir. 1992).
141. See United States v. Tucker, 836 F.2d 334, 338-40 (7th Cir. 1988).
142. See United States v. Bishop, 959 F.2d 820, 821, 827 (9th Cir. 1992).
143. See Minetos v. City University of New York, 925 F. Supp. 177, 183 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
Under the New York Guidelines, reasons that will be presumed pretextual include:
the attorney's concern for a balanced jury ... the juror's being too old or too young
• . . the juror's living in the same or an adjacent community . . . the attorney's
feeling that the juror 'did not appeal to him or her'. . . the attorney's lack of time to
question the juror... [and] the juror's clothing, where other jurors' clothing was not
an issue.
Id. Reasons that will be presumed non-pretextual include "the juror's having a job that is police
related ... the juror gives inconsistent statements regarding his or her leanings ... prior criminal
jury service by the juror . . . the juror's tardiness ... the juror's familiarity with the crime scene
... the juror's criminal record ... [and] the juror's related expertise. " Id.
144. 925 F. Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
145. Id. at 183.
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one Hispanic from the prospective jury, and the defendants objected that
the plaintiff had used all of her peremptories to strike only white
males.146 The defendants offered the following explanations for their
peremptory challenges:
The individual ... indicated that he didn't feel that people ... needed
to speak English on the job. And the question of ... foreign language
is right at the heart of this case ... With respect to the black woman
... she was a teacher in the ... public school system which is exactly
what the plaintiff is ... [The third juror] is a blue collar worker with
no office experience whatsoever, which is a factor for us.' 4 7
The court found that these explanations were pretextual because the
defendants exclusively struck Hispanic and African American venireper-
sons, which created an unmistakable pattern of discrimination.' 48 It also
found that the plaintiffs proffered reason for striking the white males,
"to exclude individuals who [were] viewed as pro-management," was
not credible. Because the New York City business community is "dis-
proportionately white ... the 'promanagement' excuse offers easy cover
for those with discriminatory motives in jury selection."' 49 Although
the plaintiff's and defendants' justifications for their peremptories
appeared plausible, the court was unwilling to accept them. It held that,
given the plaintiffs own Batson error, equity did not favor granting her
a new trial based on the defendant's Batson violations. 50
Judge Motley observed that the New York Guidelines effectively
provided attorneys a "how-to guide for defeating Batson challenges." ''
Such guidelines allow litigants to mask their discriminatory motives by
using non-genuine justifications that would survive judicial review.
Although the Purkett Court attempted to prevent this practice by requir-
ing the trial court to assess the challenger's genuineness and plausibil-
ity,15 2 a court would be extremely reluctant to second-guess a
146. Id. at 180.
147. Id. at 181, 182. The defendant considered these characteristics to be "factors" because the
plaintiff, an office assistant, had brought suit against a university alleging, inter alia,
discrimination on the basis of origin and Hispanic accent in violation of Title VII.
148. Id. at 182.
149. Id. The court found the plaintiff's "promanagement" justification for striking white
professional veniremembers to be presumptively pretextual based in part on the New York
Guidelines, which state that striking a juror because of his employment will be presumed
pretextual. Id. at 184. The Guidelines also state that striking a juror because he "is employed in a
creative field" will be presumed nonpretextual. See id. Because employment in a creative field is
a subset of employment in general, it is difficult to see the logic in this distinction.
150. Id. at 185.
151. Id; see also Greg B. Enos, Discriminatory Peremptory Strikes in Civil Trials, 58 TEX. B.
J. 228, 232 (1995) ("[An intelligent attorney can defeat a Batson challenge by dreaming up any
excuse that is not based on racial, religious, or other prohibited modes of discrimination.").
152. See Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768-69 (1995).
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justification that is presumptively non-pretextual. Judge Motley used
this reasoning to conclude that the Batson and Purkett protections are
"illusory" because they fail to "truly unmask racial discrimination." '53
He added that "peremptory challenges per se violate equal protec-
tion,"' 154 joining Justice Marshall in advocating a ban on their use.
A judge's failure to conduct a two-step Batson inquiry also can lead
to reversible error so that defense counsel can take advantage of this
failure to obtain a new trial.'55 In U.S. v. Huey,156 counsel for a white
criminal defendant, Huey, peremptorily struck five African-American
venirepersons.157 When the co-defendant, Garcia, made Batson objec-
tions to the strikes, the court required no response or explanation from
Huey's counsel and allowed the strikes.' 58 After the case proceeded to
trial, both defendants were convicted. 159 They appealed their conviction
on the grounds that the jury selection process violated the equal protec-
tion rights of the five excluded jurors.160
In reversing the convictions, the appellate court found that the trial
court, by failing to request a race-neutral explanation, had failed to pro-
tect the rights of the excluded jurors.1 6' The court noted, "We are not
unaware that there is some irony in reversing Huey's conviction given
that it was his counsel who made the discriminatory strikes. We are con-
vinced, however, that this result is consistent with the teachings of Bat-
son and its progeny."'' 62 The Huey case encourages defense attorneys,
when zealously representing their clients, to exercise discriminatory per-
emptories in the hope that the judge will not conduct an inquiry that
would result in reversible error. Huey thus rewards discriminatory
behavior on the part of defense attorneys, while attempting to protect the
rights of excluded jurors.' 63
The Seventh Circuit expressly disagreed with Huey in U.S. v.
Boyd 164 when it rejected a defendant's contention that he was entitled to
a new trial based upon an unconstitutional challenge exercised by his
counsel. The court stated that "giving a defendant a new trial because of
153. Minetos v. City Univ. of N.Y., 925 F. Supp. 177, 185 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
154. Id.
155. See U.S. v. Huey, 76 F.3d 638 (5th Cir. 1996).
156. 76 F.3d 638 (5th Cir. 1996).
157. Id. at 638.
158. See id. at 640.
159. See id.
160. See id.
161. Id. at 641.
162. Id.
163. See generally Audrey M. Fried, Fulfilling the Promise of Batson: Protecting Jurors From
the Use of Race-Based Peremptory Challenges by Defense Counsel, 64 U. CHI, L. Rav. 1311
(1997).
164. 86 F.3d 719, 721 (7th Cir. 1996).
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his own violation of the Constitution would make a laughingstock of the
judicial process." '165
IV. THE PEREMPTORY'S FUNCTIONAL ELIMINATION IN FLORIDA
Florida courts have been active in attempting to prevent the dis-
criminatory use of peremptory challenges prior to the Supreme Court's
decision in Batson v. Kentucky. As the discussion below demonstrates,
the courts' vigor in recognizing the existence of a prima facie case and
in disallowing strikes, based upon findings of pretext, has accelerated
the process of destroying the peremptory as an effective tool of jury
selection.
A. History of the Challenge in Florida
Florida courts generally have provided litigants greater protection
than federal courts in attempting to prevent discriminatory jury selection
practices. 166 The Florida Supreme Court has employed a burden-shift-
ing analysis since 1984, which has resulted in a complex and conflicting
body of case law. Prior to Batson, the court in State v. Neil'6 7 decided
that the Florida Constitution recognized a protection against improper
bias in jury selection that exceeded the current federal guarantees. 6 It
established that a party challenging the opponent's use of a peremptory
challenge must "make a timely objection and demonstrate on the record
that the challenged persons are members of a distinct racial group and
that there is a strong likelihood that they have been challenged solely
because of their race."' 169 If the court finds that such a likelihood exists,
the burden shifts to the challenger to show that the strikes were not race-
based. 170 If the party has been challenging jurors on the basis of race,
then the court should dismiss the jury pool and start voir dire again with
a new pool. 7 '
165. Id. at 725.
166. See State v. Slappy, 522 So. 2d 18, 20-21 (Fla. 1988).
167. 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1984), clarified sub nom., State v. Castillo, 486 So. 2d 565 (Fla.
1986).
168. Neil, 457 So. 2d at 486.
169. Id.
170. See id. at 486-87. The social ramifications of race-based strikes are particularly evident in
areas with a history of racial tension. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury:
Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. Cm. L. REv. 153, 195-
96 (1989) (describing riots and public outrage engendered by two trials in Miami, Florida, in
which African-American jurors were peremptorily stricken by white defendants accused of racial
assault).
171. See Neil, 457 So.2d at 487. The court clarified Neil's application in State v. Castillo, 486
So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1986), where it held that the Neil rule applied to all cases pending on direct
appeal when Neil became final. Castillo, 486 So.2d at 565. It also stated that a timely objection
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The Florida Supreme Court clarified the Neil burden-shifting analy-
sis in State v. Slappy. 72 It required first that a party must object to his
opponent's use of the peremptory challenge. Once the court determines
that the complaining party's objection is proper and not frivolous, the
burden of proof shifts, and the opponent must rebut the inference that its
use of the peremptory challenge is discriminatory.' 73 This rebuttal must
consist of a "clear and reasonably specific" racially neutral explanation
of "legitimate reasons" for the use of the peremptory challenges. 74
The Slappy prosecutor used four of the state's six peremptory chal-
lenges to exclude African-Americans from the panel, although all four
had indicated an ability to serve as fair and impartial jurors. The state
explained its striking of two of the African-American jurors by claiming
that they were teachers, which indicated a "degree of liberalism" and
sympathy for "people who go astray."' 7 5 Although the state's explana-
tion that teachers were often liberals was superficially reasonable, the
prosecutor did not question the challenged jurors to demonstrate that
they were in fact liberal. The court stated, "If they indeed possessed this
trait, the state could have established it by a few questions taking very
little of the court's time."' 76 The court stressed the necessity for record-
support to establish the absence of pretext, based on answers provided
during voir dire or other facts on the record.'77
The Slappy court was sensitive to Justice Marshall's concern in
Batson that prevarication and unconscious racism in the strike's use
would make its protections illusory.' 78 Its requirement for record-sup-
port has led to lengthy questioning during voir dire in an attempt to
establish whether particular justifications are pretextual. The decision
must be raised prior to the swearing of the jury: "the issue being presented for the first time on a
motion for mistrial, after the jury is sworn, is not timely." Id.
172. 522 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 1988).
173. See id. at 22.
174. See id. The court listed five factors which would weigh against the legitimacy of a race-
neutral explanation: (1) the alleged group bias was not shared by the juror in question, (2) the state
failed to examine or perfunctorily examined the juror, assuming neither the court nor opposing
counsel had questioned the juror, (3) the juror was singled out through questions designed to
provoke a particular response, (4) the proffered reason was unrelated to the facts of the case, and
(5) the proffered reasons were equally applicable to jurors who were not challenged. Id.
175. Id. at 19-20.
176. Id. at 23.
177. Id. It also noted that "liberalism" also reasonably could be construed as favorable to the
defense's position, rather than the prosecutor's, because liberals arguably "are more likely to
convict someone for violating gun-control laws." Id. The court was careful to emphasize that the
trial court's function is not to substitute its judgment for that of the prosecutor in determining
reasonableness, but merely to decide whether "some reasonable persons would agree" with the
state's assertions. Id.
178. Id. at 22-23.
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led to administrative difficulties, 79 which were exacerbated by the Flor-
ida courts' wide latitude in defining the cognizable group requirement.
1. PROTECTED GROUPS IN FLORIDA
Florida courts have been expansive since Batson and Neil in deter-
mining which classes of venirepersons constitute protected groups. The
Florida Supreme Court found Hispanics to be a cognizable ethnic group
in State v. Alen.'8 0 It relied heavily upon the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Hernandez v. Texas,'81 which held that persons of
Mexican descent were a separate ethnic class for purposes of the per-
emptory challenge. The Alen court established a "two-prong" test to
determine whether an ethnic group fits into a cognizable class: first,
whether the group's population is large enough that the general commu-
nity recognizes it as an identifiable group, and second, whether the
group is internally cohesive, based on attitudes or experiences that may
not be adequately represented by other segments of society.' 82 The
court found that Hispanics satisfied both prongs. 83 It noted, however,
that national origin, native language, and surname are not dispositive in
establishing a person's ethnicity. 184 The trial court has discretion to
make this determination when an objection is made to a peremptory
challenge. 85
A juror's religious affiliation also may satisfy the cognizable ethnic
class requirement in Florida.'86 In Joseph v. State,187 the prosecutor
sought to excuse a venireperson, Ms. Friedman, and the defendant's
attorney objected, based upon the Neil/Slappy decisions. The appellate
court applied the two-prong test set forth in Alen and recognized Jewish
persons as a cognizable class.1 8 8 It looked at the Jewish population in
179. See, e.g., Joseph A. Tringali, The Challenge of Peremptory Challenges, A Brief Study in
the Evolution of the Law, FLA. B. J., June 1997, at 100, 102 ("The now designated Neil/Slappy
rule was troublesome from the start simply because most lawyers are not very reasonable when
picking a jury.").
180. 616 So. 2d 452, 453 (Fla. 1993).
181. 347 U.S. 475, 480 (1954).
182. Alen, 616 So. 2d at 454.
183. Id. at 455.
184. Id.
185. See id. at 456. Gender based peremptories were similarly held to be constitutionally
impermissible in Abshire v. State, 642 So. 2d 542, 544 (Fla. 1994). A male defendant objected to
the prosecution's exclusion of women jurors after he said, "Judge, if we can get something besides
women and former police officers, we'll get us a panel." Id. at 543 n.4. The court held that these
comments violated the prospective juror's and the defendant's rights to equal protection. Id. at
544.
186. See Joseph v. State, 636 So. 2d 777, 780 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994).
187. 636 So. 2d 777 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994).
188. Id. at 780.
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Dade County, from which the venire was drawn, and found that they
comprised approximately ten percent of the population, thus satisfying
the first prong of the Alen test.'89 It also noted that shared religious
beliefs may establish the characteristics of an ethnic group.' 90 The court
consequently found the prosecutor's peremptory challenge to be a proxy
for discrimination, and it remanded the case for a new trial. 191
The court recognized a number of problems in its Joseph decision,
stating that extending Batson to religious affiliations "may be character-
ized by some as another nail in the coffin of the peremptory challenge
system."'' 92 It noted the difficulties in determining whether a venireper-
son belongs to a particular religious group, and it allowed reliance on
criteria besides surname to determine whether a juror is Jewish, "such as
the wearing of a yarmulke, a six-pointed star, or the distinctive attire of
the Hasidic Jews."' 193
The Joseph and Alen decisions require litigants to be aware of the
ethnic composition of their particular community, and thus turn judges
and attorneys into amateur anthropologists in assessing the existence of
identifiable ethnic groups. These cases raise problems in identifying
whether Irish-Americans would be an identifiable group in Boston, but
not in Honolulu, and whether groups that are "internally cohesive" none-
theless do not comprise a significant population in the general commu-
nity. These problems increase substantially when attorneys must rely on
surname or attire to establish these factors.
2. NONDISCRIMINATORY JUSTIFICATIONS
The Slappy decision's administrative burdens during voir dire were
increased by the United States Supreme Court's decision in Purkett. In
Melbourne v. State 9 4 the Florida Supreme Court refined its Neil/Slappy
requirements to establish new guidelines in exercising peremptory chal-




192. Id. at 781.
193. Id. at 780. Reliance on surname and descent, absent other criteria, can be misleading and
speculative, when direct questioning on the issue is inappropriate. See United States v.
Somerstein, 959 F. Supp. 592, 595 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); United States v. Greer, 968 F.2d 433, 438
(5th Cir. 1992) ("where, as here, the court has inquired adequately into the jurors' possible biases,
that is, in a manner reasonably calculated to identify any bias, the failure to inquire that the
prospective jurors of a particular religion identify themselves does not constitute an abuse of
discretion nor render the trial constitutionally suspect"); see also supra notes 106-17 and
accompanying text.
194. 679 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 1996).
195. Id. at 764.
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objection, state that the strike is racially motivated, and request the court
to ask the strike's proponent to justify it.196 At the second stage, the
burden of production shifts to the strike's proponent to provide a race-
neutral explanation.1 97 Third, if the explanation is facially race-neutral,
and the court believes that the explanation is not a pretext given the
circumstances surrounding the strike, it will be sustained. 198 The court
must focus on the genuineness of the explanation, rather than on its rea-
sonableness. 199 The burden of persuasion as to the strike's discrimina-
tory use rests with the opponent of the strike, and peremptories are
presumed to be exercised in a nondiscriminatory manner.2°° Even when
the inquiry is unfavorable, the litigant must renew his objection before
the jury is sworn to preserve the issue for appeal.2" The Melbourne
decision shifted the court's focus from the reasonableness of the prof-
fered explanation, as required by Slappy, to its credibility, as required by
Purkett.202
Florida courts generally have been vigorous in finding Batson vio-
lations under the Neil/Slappy inquiry.203 In a survey period between
1986 and 1993, 91% of complainants were able to establish a prima
facie case of racial or ethnic discrimination in jury selection.21 Of
those, 68.18% were able to successfully establish a Batson violation
based upon the inadequacy of the proffered explanation. 205  The
Supreme Court's relaxation of the second stage inquiry in Purkett, com-





200. See id. The need for public confidence in the judicial system, preserved by this
presumption, is especially high in cases involving race-related crimes. See Georgia v. McCollum,
505 U.S. 42, 49 (1992).
201. See Melbourne, 679 So. 2d at 765.
202. The Third District Court of Appeal addressed the remarkably low threshold established by
Purkett when it stated,
[A]s an extreme example to make what appears to be an illusive point, if in response
to a Melbourne inquiry the proponent of a peremptory strike were to explain that he
or she believed the juror in question was an extra-terrestrial and consequently not
sufficiently familiar with life on the planet Earth to serve as a juror, the reason
would be facially race-neutral and valid because it is not race-based. The absurdity
or implausibility of the reason is irrelevant to the step two analysis.
Johnson v. State, 706 So. 2d 401, 403 n.1 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998).
203. See Melilli, supra note 9, at 470 ("Of the 191 successful claims [between 1986 and 1993]
111 (or 58.7%) of these claims came from just five states: Alabama, Florida, Illinois, New York,
and Texas.").
204. See id. at 466 (concluding that the prima facie case showing was a minor obstacle in
Florida courts).
205. See id. at 469.
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nation of pretext,2 °6 show the increasing difficulty litigants encounter in
successfully using the strike in Florida.
The Florida Supreme Court recently addressed both the cognizable
class and race-neutral explanation requirements in State v. Franqui.20 7 It
relaxed the burden in establishing record support that the challenged
juror is a member of a distinct racial group.20 8 The Franqui defendant's
counsel, Mr. Diaz, used his peremptory strike against a prospective juror
named Diaz. The prosecutor objected, stating, "Are they striking Aurelio
Diaz? State would challenge that strike.""2 9 The defense counsel justi-
fied the strike by saying, "I don't like him. 2 °10 The trial court disal-
lowed the strike because the defense did not provide a race-neutral
reason for his exercise of the challenge.211
The Florida Supreme Court held that the trial court properly disal-
lowed the defendant's peremptory challenge because it "clearly under-
stood that the objection to the challenge of a venireperson in Dade
County, who was born and raised in Havana, Cuba, and whose name
was Aurelio Diaz, was being made on racial grounds. 21 2 The court
found this to be "especially true" because there was never any conten-
tion that Diaz was not a member of a cognizable minority. 213
It also found that the justification, "I don't like him," may have
appeared to be race-neutral, but the transcript yielded no obvious reason
for disqualification. 2 4  Diaz had been questioned extensively by the
court, the prosecutor, and defense counsel, and the lack of record-sup-
port for disqualification showed that the defense counsel's reasons for
the strike were not credible.21 5
Justice Anstead dissented in part, stating that even if the State had
noted juror Diaz's ethnicity or race for the record, "there was . . . no
reason for the trial court to require Franqui, a Cuban, male defendant, to
provide a race-neutral justification for striking prospective juror Diaz,
206. See Johnson, 706 So. 2d at 404 (stating that a trial judge does not have to articulate his
thought process in assessing the genuineness of a proffered justification, if, reading his comments
in context, he appears to disbelieve it); see also King v. Byrd, 716 So. 2d 831, 834 (Fla. DCA
1998) ("Melbourne left decisions with respect to peremptory challenges to the trial court. Because
those decisions turn on credibility determinations which encompass the assessment of all the
circumstances and dynamics of the trial setting, appellate review is very narrow indeed.").
207. 699 So. 2d 1332 (Fla. 1997).
208. See id. at 1335.
209. Id. at 1334.
210. Id.
211. See id.






presumably a Cuban male resident of Dade County. 21 6 He added that
"[i]f there is ever a case where the presumption that peremptory strikes
are exercised in a nondiscriminatory manner holds true, it is this one. "217
He observed that the use of a peremptory strike becomes suspect when it
appears to be used prejudicially, which logically requires that the pro-
spective juror has characteristics which would "seem to be adverse to
the position of the challenger. 218
The Franqui opinion puts the peremptory challenge deeper into its
grave. By allowing a general objection to the strike's use, the court
effectively presumes that a challenge is based on bias, so long as the
juror falls within a protected class. 219 This conflicts with prior deci-
sions, which require both a showing of discriminatory purpose and a
presumption that the peremptory challenge is exercised in a nondiscrimi-
natory manner. 220 The likelihood of improper bias is very low to nonex-
istent when the challenging attorney seeks to strike jurors with the same
ethnic or racial characteristics as his client. It is even lower when the
attorney also apparently belongs to the same ethnic group as the stricken
juror. As a result, viable objections to the use of the challenge have been
greatly broadened. This further limits the litigant's ability to use per-
emptory challenges according to their original purpose. As Justice Har-
ding noted in his dissent:
By affirming the trial court's handling of this matter, the majority
confirms the trial court's erroneous assertion that peremptory chal-
lenges no longer exist... If nothing more than a general objection
can thwart the use of the peremptory challenge, then we do eliminate
peremptory challenges as they have been used historically and substi-
tute in their place two classes of challenges for cause.221
216. Id. at 1337.
217. Id.
218. Id. (finding this to be the case in "the overwhelming majority of cases-if not every
case-in which a peremptory challenge has been disallowed under Batson and Neil."). Compare
Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 492 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the
defendant's race may be irrelevant to his standing to raise the Batson equal protection claim, as
Batson also protects the rights of the venire and of the general public to be free from
discrimination). Although there is a possibility that the attorney may be striking the Hispanic
juror based on his own prejudice, it is unlikely given the ethnicity of his client.
219. The use of a general objection depends upon the trial court's "clear understanding" that
the objection is-made on racial or gender-grounds. Franqui, 699 So, 2d at 1335. The Franqui
opinion thus allows unsupported reliance on the trial judge's assessment of ethnicity, and it
essentially allows the objecting party to accuse the proponent of the strike of racism without a
supporting foundation.
220. See Davis v. State, 691 So. 2d 1180, 1182 (Fla. 1997); Melbourne v. State, 679 So. 2d
759, 764 (Fla. 1996).
221. Franqui, 699 So. 2d at 1339, 1341.
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B. Practical Difficulties in Exercising The Peremptory Challenge
in Florida
The successful use of the peremptory strike in its current form in
Florida depends upon a recognition of the ethnic distribution within the
litigant's community,222 an assessment of the distribution of potential
jurors within the jury pool, 223 and record-support for the strike through
sufficient questioning. For example, a pattern of strikes against a pro-
tected group or the single strike of the sole member of a protected group
in the venire could give rise to an inference of discrimination.224
Illustrative is Harrison v. Emanuel,225  which upheld the trial
court's denial of the defendant's strike of an African-American juror in a
case involving a rear-end automobile collision, even though the juror,
like the plaintiff, had been rear-ended in a past car accident.226 The
court found this reason to be pretextual because the juror and the plain-
tiff had a common race, and the juror was the only African-American
veniremember challenged by defense counsel. 227 Although the justifica-
tion for the strike was reasonable, the court did not find it to be credible.
Consequently, even if the practitioner makes a clear record establishing
the reasons for his strike, the venire's composition could allow a finding
of discrimination.228
The challenge of one juror in a protected group, after accepting
other jurors who share the same alleged bias, also can establish discrimi-
222. See State v. Alen, 616 So. 2d 452, 454 (Fla. 1993).
223. See Harrison v. Emanuel, 694 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997).
224. See, e.g., State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1984); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79
(1986) (prosecutor used the challenges to dismiss all four African-American jurors).
225. 694 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997).
226. Id. at 761.
227. Id. at 762.
228. Compare Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474 (1990), where the Court stated that the
prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to strike the only two African-American veniremen did
not violate the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a fair cross-section of the community. The
Court stated that "to say that the Sixth Amendment deprives the State of the ability to 'stack the
deck' in its favor is not to say that each side may not, once a fair hand is dealt, use peremptory
challenges to eliminate prospective jurors belonging to groups it believes would unduly favor the
other side." Id. at 481. The Court noted, however, that only the Sixth Amendment claim was at
issue in that case, and not the equal protection claim. Id. at 487. Under Batson, a pattern of strikes
against a particular racial group of veniremen would support an inference of discriminatory
purpose under the Equal Protection Clause. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986); but
see J.E.B. v. Alabama, 500 U.S. 127, 143 (1994) ("Challenging all persons who have military
experience would disproportionately affect men at this time, while challenging all persons
employed as nurses would disproportionately affect women. Without a showing of pretext,
however, these challenges may well not be unconstitutional, since they are not gender- or race-
based.") (citing Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991)). The likelihood of a finding of
discrimination may be lower with a gender-based strike, because women as a group do not
generally constitute so small a percentage of the venire that striking them would eliminate their
presence on the jury. See Melili, supra note 9, at 455.
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nation.229 For instance, the appellate court in Randall v. State230 found
the challenge of a juror to be unconstitutionally discriminatory, in spite
of the juror's statement that he could not convict based solely upon the
testimony of one witness. Because the State had accepted another juror
who shared the same views about testimonial evidence, the appellate
court found the State's reason for the strike to be pretextual.231
The absence of record-support that the venireperson has the alleged
bias also will allow a finding of pretext.232 In Haile v. State,23 3 the
appellate court found that the prosecutor's peremptory challenge of the
sole remaining African-American venireperson was impermissible
because he assumed, without support, that she was "forgiving" because
she read the Bible. 234 The court stated that the trial court should have
inquired more deeply into the prosecutor's reasons for the strike, adding,
"[T]his court cannot conclude, without evidence related to the facts of
the case, that the reading of the Bible, a practice embraced by a signifi-
cant percentage of the American public, would render that portion of the
population inherently partial. 235
229. See State v. Slappy, 522 So. 2d 18, 22 (Fla. 1988).
230. 718 So. 2d 230, 231-232 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998).
231. See id.
232. See Slappy, 522 So. 2d at 22; see also Stroud v. State, 656 So. 2d 195, 196 (Fla. 1st DCA
1995) (finding a peremptory challenge to a prospective African-American juror was pretextual,
when she was stricken because the prosecutor did not like her brief answer to what she thought of
the criminal justice system, and then failed to conduct a further inquiry).
233. 672 So. 2d 555 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996).
234. Id. at 556.
235. Id. Compare King v. Byrd, 716 So. 2d 831, 834 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), which held that the
trial court properly found a doctor's reason for peremptorily striking an African-American
veniremember was pretextual, in a medical malpractice action involving a brain-damaged child,
where the veniremember was a single mother of two young children. Although the striking of the
juror in King appeared to be related to the facts of the case, the doctor's counsel also stated that he
"could strike anyone even if he didn't like the cut of their hair." Id. But see Smith v. State, 662
So. 2d 1336, 1338 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (finding that the trial court abused its discretion in
prohibiting the peremptory strike of a single mother with two children because the state's primary
witness was also a single mother, and the strike was related to the facts of the case). In Haile,
King, and Smith, there was no additional questioning to establish record-support for the
venirepersons' alleged sympathies, and all three cases have discordant results. The Smith court
observed the increasing difficulties Florida courts have in interpreting the complex requirements
of peremptory challenge jurisprudence.
We pause at this juncture to acknowledge the trial court's well-founded observation
in the record that it is often difficult to keep abreast of the ever-changing principles
which govern what has become a most complex body of trial-related jurisprudence
... We also recognize the myriad of difficult scenarios confronting trial courts in
attempting to correctly apply these principles, especially when an error made even
before the jury is sworn becomes irreversible no matter how error-free the trial may
eventually be and no matter that the jury's verdict is supported by substantial,
competent evidence.
Id. at 1339 (emphasis added).
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As Harrison demonstrates, however, record-support would be
insufficient to sustain a strike if the composition of the jury pool would
support an inference of discrimination. Litigants are placed in the unwel-
come position where it may be useless to peremptorily strike the last or
only representative of a protected group because no justification may be
sufficiently credible to overcome the inference of discrimination.2 36
The main, and perhaps only, benefit of the detailed questions cur-
rently necessary during voir dire, to support the nondiscriminatory use
of the peremptory challenge, is that they may also arm the litigant with a
strike for cause. Striking for cause is not only appropriate and more
desirable in removing partial jurors, it is also far less complex than using
the current peremptory challenge. 237
V. WHAT REMAINS OF THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE?
The expansion of the cognizable class requirement and the discrep-
ancy in state and federal courts' acceptances of proffered explanations as
credible have undermined the effectiveness of the peremptory challenge.
African-Americans, Italian-Americans, Native-Americans, Asian-Amer-
icans, Hispanics, Jews, and gender are currently all cognizable classes in
either state or federal courts.238 A peremptory strike upon almost any
venireperson could thus generate both an objection and a race or gender-
neutral explanation by the other party. As Justice O'Connor pointed out
in 1994, "Batson mini-hearings are now routine in state and federal trial
courts, and Batson appeals have proliferated as well. ' 239 The expansive-
ness of the cognizable class requirement could continue in state and fed-
eral courts as the demographics change within communities. The reach
of the challenge to include particular groups could turn attorneys and
judges into amateur anthropologists, attempting to discern from jurors'
names, language, and clothing whether they represent an identifiable
group.2 40 A further and logical extension of Batson's protections to a
juror's protected speech and associations also would effectively extin-
guish peremptory challenges. 241 The administrative difficulties in effec-
tively implementing the post-Batson challenge support its abolition,
236. See also Michael A. Cressler, Powers v. Ohio: The Death Knell for the Peremptory
Challenge?, 28 IDAHo L. REV. 349, 350-51 (1991) ("With the focus upon the newly created equal
protection rights of the challenged venireman, the potential for equal protection claims against the
exercise of peremptory challenges becomes incalculable, while the future of the practice itself
becomes doubtful.").
237. See infra text accompanying notes 282-89.
238. See supra text accompanying notes 87-97.
239. J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 147 (1994).
240. See State v. Alen, 616 So. 2d 452, 453 (Fla. 1993).
241. See supra text accompanying notes 118-23.
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particularly because its effectiveness as a tool in jury selection, as
demonstrated below, is questionable at best.
A. The Challenge's Inaccuracy in Successfully Predicting
Jurors' Verdicts
Attorneys exercising the peremptory challenge are generally unsuc-
cessful in reliably predicting jurors' tendencies, according to the numer-
ous empirical studies conducted in this area.242 Those studies have
overwhelmingly concluded that the nature and strength of the evidence
are the most determinative factors in the outcome of the trial, rather than
the jurors' characteristics. 243 The studies also have established that there
is little support for attorneys' beliefs that jurors' backgrounds (e.g. race,
social class, education, gender), social and political attitudes, and per-
sonality characteristics are predictive of their verdict preferences in par-
ticular cases. 2 4
242. See Kramer et al., supra note 16, at 668 ("[T]here is little evidence that attorneys'
peremptory challenges are reliably related to jurors' verdict preferences."); Michael Saks, The
Limits of Scientific Jury Selection: Ethical and Empirical, 17 JURIMETRiCS J. 3, 13 (1976) ("No
evidence exists to support the apparently widely held belief that scientific jury selection is a
powerful tool .. "); Hans Zeisel & Shari S. Diamond, The Effect of Peremptory Challenges on
Jury and Verdict: An Experiment in Federal District Court, 30 STAN. L. REV. 491, 517 (1978)
(observing after comparing attorneys' predictions of bias with the verdicts of stricken jurors who
were allowed to witness the trials. "The collective performance of the attorneys is not
impressive."); see also Solomon M. Fulero & Steven Penrod, The Myths and Realities of Attorney
Jury Selection Folklore and Scientific Jury Selection: What Works? 17 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 229
(1990)) (examining empirical studies addressing the efficacy of attorneys' jury selection
strategies, including the studies' methodological difficulties). Fulero and Penrod conclude that:
though a number of researchers have made preliminary excursions into the
empirical evaluation of attorney voir dire behavior and accuracy, it is still quite
rudimentary. . .Broeder's and Zeisel and Diamond's results certainly suggest that
attorneys are not very accurate in their selections. The studies by Blauner, Padawer-
Singer, Sinder, and Singer, and Van Dyke suggest that attorneys do exercise their
challenges systematically, but the results of Hawrish and Tate, Hayden and Penrod
suggest that the systematicness may extend only to a few demographic
characteristics of limited predictive value.
Id. at 243-44 (footnotes omitted). Accord HASrIE ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY 237 (1983) ("The
literature on juror personology available to practicing attorneys is rich in predictions of individual
bias in verdict preference which were not borne out in the present results ... ").
243. See Saks, supra note 242, at 20 ("There is simply no empirical foundation for such
statements as the following, offered by its authors as 'a very obvious fact: the people who
constitute the jury have as much or more to do with the outcome of a trial as the evidence and
arguments.' Indeed, the data consistently and directly contradict that conclusion."); Fulero &
Penrod, supra note 242, at 253 ("the nature and strength of the evidence in a given case is the
critical variable in predicting verdict .... "); LOH, supra note 21, at 403 ("In the trial setting,
features of the proceeding itself are the decisive influences on the jury verdict. . . Simulation
studies 'are unanimous in showing that evidence is a substantially more potent determinant of
jurors' verdicts than the individual characteristics of jurors.'") (citations omitted).
244. See LOH, supra note 21, at 402 ("Since 1970, there have been a large number of jury
simulations on the effects of various personality and demographic characteristics of mock jurors
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Researchers generally have adopted two strategies in assessing the
reliability of attorneys' predictions - one of surveying sitting jurors at
the end of their jury service and comparing their verdicts to attorneys'
predictions, and the other of presenting attorneys with information about
mock jurors before a simulated trial, in order to establish whether their
assessments of jurors' verdict preferences were accurate. 245 For exam-
ple, one study created "shadow juries" out of those who had been
peremptorily stricken in twelve criminal trials. The study allowed them
to remain in the courtroom during the trials.2 46 The researchers then
reconstructed the votes of the juries that would have decided the case
had there been no peremptory challenges.2 47  The study concluded that
the votes of challenged jurors were unlikely to differ significantly from
the jurors who were not removed. 48
Researchers in another study exposed mock jurors to prejudicial
pre-trial publicity and videotaped them as they responded to questions
during a simulated voir dire.249 The researchers then sent the tapes to
on their decision making... In general, 'although the literature indicates that authoritarians do
indeed recommend more severe punishment . . only a single study has shown they are more
likely to vote for conviction ...Another review also concluded that 'the claim that high
authoritarian jurors have a proclivity for guilty verdicts is also unwarranted ... With respect to
individual differences other than authoritarianism, there is also no unequivocal proof of a direct,
one to one relationship with conduct .... ) (citations omitted); accord Fulero & Penrod, supra
note 242, at 253; see also HASTIE aT AL., supra note 242, at 149 ("In summary, the relationship is
weak between the background characteristics of jurors, such as demography, personality, and
general attitudes, and their verdict preferences in typical felony cases."). In those cases where
attorneys have effectively used the strike in an empirically demonstrable manner, they were
generally aided by social scientists. See John T. Frederick, Social Science Involvement in Voir
Dire: Preliminary Data on the Effectiveness of "Scientific Jury Selection," 2 BEHAv. Sci. & L.
375 (1984) (researchers conducted an attitudinal survey of 976 registered voters, and then
conducted a mock jury project for the defendant, concluding that the estimates could accurately
predict verdicts in an analogous trial situation); see also John B. McConohay et al., The Use of
Social Science in Trials with Political and Social Overtones: The Trial of Joan Little, 41 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBs. 205 (1977) cited in JOHN MONAHAN & LAURENS WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN
LAW 573-78 (4th ed. 1998) (using social scientists to estimate the potential of prospective jurors to
be pro-defense, based upon their demographic rating, authoritarianism, or body language, the
defense attorneys selected a jury that acquitted the defendant of all charges).
245. See Fulero & Penrod, supra note 242, at 244. See generally Zeisel & Diamond, supra
note 242, at 517; Kramer et al., supra note 16, at 680-85.
246. See Zeisel & Diamond, supra note 242, at 492, 498.
247. See id. at 492.
248. The study observed that prosecutors and, to a lesser degree defense attorneys, were
generally unable to use the challenge to their benefit. See id. at 517. Zeisel and Diamond
concluded that "the average fluctuations around the mean scores are plus or minus 38 for the
prosecutor and plus or minus 25 for the defense, suggesting that in this limited sample of twelve
cases, attorney performance was highly erratic." Id. This study is significant by its use of a control
group to compare the actual verdicts with those that would have been delivered, had the
challenges not been employed. It also had the benefit of observing actually stricken jurors' verdict
results in actual criminal trials, which simulated studies could not provide.
249. See Kramer et al., supra note 16, at 672.
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trial judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys, who estimated whether
they would peremptorily challenge a juror and which way the juror
would lean in the trial.150 The jurors went on to deliberate and reach a
verdict in a mock criminal trial.2 51 The researchers found that, although
the prosecutors had some success in identifying unfavorable jurors, the
judges and defense attorneys could not consistently and accurately pre-
dict unfavorable jurors. 2  Their predictions were about as accurate as
flipping a coin.2 5' The study concluded that "attorneys overestimate
their ability to predict juror behavior. 254
Attorneys exercising their peremptories frequently rely on unsub-
stantiated group stereotypes that jurors' education, appearance, back-
ground, and viewpoints significantly affect their verdict preferences. 5
The limited information available during voir dire about jurors' names,
250. See id. at 672, 677. The judges rated how likely they were to grant a challenge for cause
to each particular juror. Id. at 677.
251. See id. at 672. The participants rated the simulated voir dire as "fairly realistic." Id. at
679. All the standard elements of a courtroom criminal trial were included in the simulation. Id. at
674.
252. Se id. at 680-685. They stated, "More experienced judges were somewhat more effective
than their less experienced brethren in identifying, through causal challenges, those jurors who
were most inclined to convict the defendant, but the overall performance of the judges was quite
near the level of chance." Id. at 683.
253. See id. The authors of the study concluded:
As with the judges, defense attorneys' peremptory challenges were not associated
with juror verdicts. Thus, in identifying jurors hostile to their cases, defense
attorneys would have done no worse in exercising their peremptory challenges had
they simply flipped coins rather than analyzing the responses jurors made to
questions about their exposure to pretrial publicity ...The same basic analyses
were carried out for those taking on the prosecutor role. First, the correlational
analysis, with prosecutor as the unit of analysis, indicated that these ratings were
weakly, but only marginally, correlated with juror behavior. There was no
significant mean correlation between prosecutor experience and this correlational
index of effective peremptory use.
Id. at 685.
254. See id. at 700.
255. See id. at 667-68, where the authors found:
[A]ttorneys appear to rely on a variety of cues in determining whether a peremptory
challenge is necessary, including factors such as age, sex, race, national origin,
education, occupation, juror demeanor, and attorneys' intuitive perceptions of
jurors' receptiveness to their client's or their adversary's positions... [A]lthough
particular juror characteristics have shown predictive value in certain types of cases,
e.g., a juror's gender in cases involving rape, none of the typically used juror
characteristics correlate consistently or powerfully to juror verdicts across a wide
spectrum of cases.
See also Steven Penrod et al., The Implications of Social Psychological Research for Trial
Practice Attorneys, in PSYCHOLOGY & LAw 439 (D.J. Miller et al eds, 1984), cited in Nancy S.
Marder, Beyond Gender: Peremptory Challenges and the Roles of the Jury, 73 TEX. L. REv. 1041,
1138 (1995). Penrod, in an unpublished Ph.D. dissertation at Harvard University, collected demo-
graphic material on 367 members of a Boston jury pool and concluded that the jurors' age, race,
and gender "were almost useless in predicting how that person would decide a case." Id.
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addresses, family, occupation, and prior service on a civil or criminal
jury promotes fast and superficial judgments. Practice manuals often are
filled with stereotypical observations about the verdict tendencies of
groups of jurors, such as statements that women "are generally more
emotional and sympathetic"2 6 and that writers and artists will generally
rule for plaintiffs while accountants are pro-defense. 7 These group ste-
reotypes would never be sufficient to support a challenge for cause,258
and they have not been correlated with verdict preferences by numerous
studies.259 If anything, according to Professor Melilli, "One might legit-
imately question whether the stereotypes . . . indicate more about the
biases of the venirepersons in those groups or the biases of the attorneys
who exercised the peremptory challenges. '"260
Nonetheless, the opinions of the Supreme Court26' and of numerous
attorneys demonstrate an unquestioning acceptance of the peremptory's
implicit assumption that group stereotypes are predictive of hidden parti-
ality. Attorneys generally like using peremptories and are confident that
256. ROBERT AWEINKE, THE ART OF SELECTING A JURY 88 (2d ed. 1988).
257. See MELVIN BELLI, MODERN TRIALS (2d ed. 1982), cited in MONAHAN & WALKER, supra
note 244, at 570-71. Belli states,
[A]s a rule of thumb, if plaintiff is an Irishman or a Swede, prospective juror Olsen
or O'Brien ... will not be excused by plaintiffs lawyer ... The author believes that
a plaintiff does better on the amount of verdict by peremptorily challenging the
accountant, statistician, and bank and insurance clerks ... The rule of thumb here:
artists, writers, musicians, actors and public figures generally make good plaintiff
jurors ... As plaintiff's counsel and a criminal defendant's lawyer, I love this type
of juror. They are philosophically tuned in to my side of the case and will vote for
me substantively, and will usually give me a substantial reward.
Id.
258. Melilli, supra note 9, at 496-97.
259. See id. at 498 (tabulating typical group stereotypes that are frequently used in
peremptories, such as "low income, facial hair, family member unemployed, living with parents,
no prior jury service, recently relocated to area, renter, overweight, children .... " and concluding
that, other than gender and race (both of which are improper as bases for the peremptory), there
were no poll results substantiating predictive jury verdicts for any of those categories); see also
LOH, supra note 21, at 402 ("The assumption, in other words, is that human conduct is caused-or
at least conditioned-by socialization experiences or personal makeup. . . .However, there are
empirical and theoretical grounds for questioning the validity of this heroic assumption .... The
notion that who a person is determines how that person acts, irrespective of the social context, is
also at odds with recent thinking on the nature of personality."); accord Fulero & Penrod, supra
note 242, at 238.
260. Melilli, supra note 9, at 499.
261. See J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 148 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("That a trial
lawyer's instinctive assessment of a juror's predisposition cannot meet the high standards of a
challenge for cause does not mean that the lawyer's instinct is erroneous."); Swain v. Alabama,
380 U.S. at 220-21 ("[The peremptory challenge] is often exercised ...on grounds normally
thought to be irrelevant to legal proceedings or official action, namely the race, religion,
nationality, occupation or affiliations of people summoned for jury duty. For the question a
prosecutor or defense counsel must decide is not whether a juror of a particular race or nationality
is in fact partial, but whether one from a different group is less likely to be.").
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their predictions are correct, although their assessments are, by their
nature, difficult to substantiate and rely on anecdotal evidence.262 Attor-
neys sometimes discover how individual jurors voted, but they cannot
learn how a stricken juror would have voted. They are also more likely
to seek confirming information, which would allow the attorney to
maintain his jury selection theories in spite of their incorrectness. 263 As
Professor Alan Dershowitz states, "Ten years of accumulated exper-
iences may be ten years of being wrong. 2 6
Peremptory strikes have been justified as a device to remove jurors
with hidden partialities for both the defense and prosecution and to cre-
'~265ate a more "neutral" jury. Conversely, these strikes also are intended
to help litigants to "stack" the jury with people whom they believe will
be more favorable to their position.266 However, the group dynamics in
the jury deliberation process can be unpredictable, as they allow jurors
to voice a variety of viewpoints that elude the predictive patterns of
individual peremptory strikes.267 Jurors also generally take their roles
very seriously, as both judges and those observing the deliberative pro-
cess have observed. 268 Researchers often have found that the individual
differences among jurors account for little in the variation of their group
performance.2 69 Moreover, although some juror polls have shown that a
juror's race, gender, or ethnicity may have some influence on his deci-
sion-making, 270  Batson prevents any challenges made on this
262. For example, in the Kramer et al., study, supra note 16, at 689, the attorneys thought that
their predictions about how prospective jurors would vote were correct 71.9% of the time, but in
fact they were correct only 45.4% of the time.
263. Fulero & Penrod, supra note 242, embellish on this point, stating,
Negative instances are thus rarely encountered, and when they are, it is probably
simply a matter of modifying the selection slightly to incorporate the exception. If
any learning does take place under these conditions, it is likely to resemble the
superstitious behavior of animals reinforced with food at fixed or random intervals.
Id. at 238 (footnotes omitted).
264. VALERIE P. HAMs & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 76 (1986) (quoting Professor Alan
Dershowitz).
265. See id. at 983.
266. See Judith H. Germano, Preserving Peremptories: A Practitioner's Prerogative, 10 ST.
JOHN'S J. LEGAL ComMENT. 431 (1995) (stating that litigators generally try to select venirepersons
who fit the ideal juror profile for the case, focusing on a favorable outcome rather than
impartiality); William J. Schwarzer, The Federal Rules, The Adversary Process, and Discovery
Reform, 50 U. Prrr. L. REV. 703, 708 (1989) ("Jury selection itself operates to select not a truly
'fair and impartial' jury but one that has as many presumptively favorable and as few unfavorable
jurors as each lawyer can seat.").
267. See Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 233 (1978) (stating that groups generally performed
better than individuals because "prejudices of individuals were frequently counterbalanced, and
objectivity resulted.") (citations omitted).
268. See Hoffman, supra note 17, at 871.
269. See LOH, supra note 21, at 403.
270. For example, polls conducted before the O.J. Simpson trial found that African-American
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assumption.
The supposition that jurors decide cases based on their biases,
rather than on the evidence, also can create a "balkanized" effect among
jurors who perceive attorneys as striking other veniremen based upon
unsubstantiated perceptions of partiality.271 This balkanization deni-
grates the integrity of the judicial system that Batson and its progeny
sought to preserve. The judicial system, by condoning the use of unsub-
stantiated stereotypes in the exercise of the peremptory, exercises a tan-
gible injury to the rights of excluded veniremen. As Judge Hoffman
observes, "The proposition that lawyers, in the exercise of their peremp-
tory challenges, are permitted to act, and indeed are often acting, on
their most bigoted, stereotyped, and irrational hunches screams out to
everyone present during voir dire. We are not fooling anyone." '272
B. Suggestions for Reform
1. REVISING THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE INTO A MODIFIED
CHALLENGE FOR CAUSE
Some critics have suggested removing the peremptory challenge
and revising the challenge for cause.273 Under such a system, the
grounds in establishing a "for cause" challenge could list broader factors
indicating a juror's inability to be impartial.27 4 The attorney must satisfy
women, as a group, apparently thought Simpson was not guilty by a three to one margin over
African-American men. African-American men responding to the poll seemed to believe that
Simpson was not guilty by almost a three to one margin over whites. See William H. Fahey,
Peremptory Challenges, FED. LAW., Oct. 1992, at 30, 32, cited in Jason Laeser, Note, Jurors and
Litigants Beware - Savvy Attorneys Are Prepared to Strike: Has Purkett v. Elem Signaled the
Demise of the Peremptory Challenge at the Federal and State Levels?, 52 U. MIAMi L. REV. 635,
656 (1998)). One method of reconciling these assumptions in the O.J. Simpson case is that the
mostly African-American jurors may have had difficulty believing the prosecution's case in light
of the defense's contention that the Los Angeles Police Department planted some of the blood
evidence that incriminated Simpson. See Edward S. Adams & Christian Lane, Constructing A
Jury That Is Both Impartial And Representative: Utilizing Cumulative Voting In Jury Selection, 73
N.Y.U. L. REv. 703, 711 (1998). The jury's acquittal of Simpson in spite of a "mountain of
evidence" could reflect their "negative experiences with the police," rather than racial sympathies.
Id. at 711-12. Adams & Lane observe that "[p]roblems arise when public perception diverges
from jury decisions and the racial composition of the jury draws the blame." Id. at 713.
271. See Hoffman, supra note 17, at 862.
272. Id. at 863.
273. See James A. Domini & Eric Sheridan, Batson Challenges and the Jury Project: Is New
York Ready to Eliminate Discrimination from Criminal Jury Selection?, 11 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL
COMMENT. 169, 189 (1995).
274. See id. (recommending, after reviewing New York's Jury Project, which reduced the
number of peremptory challenges in civil and criminal cases, that "the Jury Project's
recommendations are only temporary solutions in the fight to eliminate all discrimination from
jury selection. The most effective and equitable solution would be a system based solely on
challenges for cause."); see also Marder, supra note 255, at 1109 (discussing the requirements of a
revised challenge for cause). Marder states, "Under a system of revised for-cause challenges, all
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those factors when stating the grounds for the challenge. The decision to
strike the juror would not be based on the litigant's "gut" reaction, and
the court would be required to make an objective decision concerning
the legitimacy of such a challenge.275 Under this system, the litigant still
would have the incentive to probe into the veniremembers' backgrounds
in order to establish the basis for a challenge for cause, and therefore
would be well informed about the jury's composition. If peremptories
are abolished and the for-cause challenge is expanded, judges may be
more inclined to remove jurors for cause who are borderline in demon-
strating an alleged bias, and could allow lengthier questioning to estab-
lish partiality.276 The judge's decisions would also be reviewable, just
as the current for-cause and peremptory challenges are currently
reviewable.
One advantage of revising the challenge for cause while abolishing
the peremptory would be for attorneys to retain some control over the
composition of the final jury. It would also allegedly end the difficulties
in applying the current form of the peremptory, and it would prevent the
use of status or other immutable characteristics from factoring into the
reasons for the strike. 277  For example, a juror who is Irish-American
could not be eliminated for cause although the defendant is British-
American, and the trial involves the sale of illegal weapons to the IRA,
unless the juror states that she could not be impartial. However, "a juror
who is a member of the Ku Klux Klan may be eliminated for cause in a
case involving racial bias because this juror has taken an individual
action that suggests bias. 278
prospective jurors are presumed eligible to serve unless they meet a limited number of enumerated
exceptions." Id. at 1112.
275. See Domini & Sheridan, supra note 273, at 188; see also Laeser, supra note 270, at 656.
Laeser proposes a "quasi-cause" challenge where attorneys would inquire into jurors'
backgrounds during voir dire to "determine whether their racial status would prevent them from
making fair and honest decisions in that case ...
If a juror has articulated opinions which do not give rise to the level of cause
challenges, but still indicate some bias, the peremptory should remain a viable
option . . .Alternatively, courts may prefer to set up a mini-trial when a juror is
stricken for perceived racial reasons . . . Perhaps if the juror felt racial
discrimination was at play, the juror could expound to the court the reasons why he
or she would not be affected by race. If one leaves this option in the hands of the
juror, and not as an automatic judicial inquiry, the ends of justice would be better
served.
Id. at 656-57. This proposal, however, undermines the presumption that the peremptory challenge
is exercised in a nondiscriminatory manner, see Melbourne, 679 So. 2d at 764, and places a
burden on the juror to object to the use of the challenge, a burden the juror may not fully under-
stand or wish to yield.
276. See Leipold, supra note 97, at 1004.
277. See Marder, supra note 255, at 1109.
278. Id. Professor Marder applies a status-conduct distinction, contending that the Ku Klux
2000]
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As the above examples demonstrate, the new guidelines could
involve considerable drafting difficulties in adding new categories that
establish bias. If organizational membership allows the use of a broader
strike for cause because it involves conduct rather than status, the guide-
lines would have to separate organizations presumptively demonstrating
bias from those that do not. Although the Ku Klux Klan is an obvious
example of a bias-based organization, Mothers Against Drunk Driving
could similarly be implicated in any case involving alcohol. Basing a
for-cause challenge upon a potential juror's organizational involvement
or other categories would run into the same empirical difficulties already
existing in justifying the peremptory challenge as a method of eliminat-
ing bias. 79 It also could infringe upon the juror's protected First
Amendment rights, by the same reasoning that extends Batson to pro-
hibit discrimination based upon a juror's protected speech and
associations.2 °
Additional categories to justify striking jurors for cause would also
be unnecessary, since the current for-cause challenge already is designed
to discover potential jurors' partiality during voir dire. Challenges for
cause generally have enumerated grounds such as consanguinity or
affinity within the fourth degree to the parties, a relationship such as
family, attorney-client, or landlord-tenant with the parties, indictment
within twelve months for a similar offense, or service as a juror within
the preceding year.28 '
The operation of the current challenge for cause in Florida illus-
trates the latitude that it already possesses in identifying bias. 82 The
juror must be excused for cause if any reasonable doubt exists as to
Klan juror is not biased due to some immutable characteristic or status, but "on the ground that
she made an individual choice." Id. In contrast, "a juror who is a woman or a man could not be
eliminated for cause even though the case involves the crime of rape ... Nor could the juror who
was raised in a poor part of town where drug use is prevalent be eliminated for cause even though
the crime involves the sale of drugs." Id.
279. See supra text accompanying notes 255-60. One possible method of resolving this
problem would be to include a potential juror's membership in a hate-based organization as
grounds for challenging him or her for cause. This would require careful drafting, such as
including membership in an organization that evidences prejudice against others on the basis or
race, religion, national origin, or gender, rather than one that, for example, demonstrates a
viewpoint against drinking. Even here this involves an understanding of the underlying beliefs of
particular organizations, e.g. White Supremacists, which could be problematic in determining
whether particular group memberships qualify.
280. See supra text accompanying notes 118-23; see also Bader, supra note 118, at 600
(contending that Batson should prohibit a defense attorney from peremptorily challenging Mothers
Against Drunk Driving, even if they had a greater than average tendency to convict). Bader states,
"The affiliation-based exclusion wrongfully prevents a qualified, unbiased juror from participating
in jury service and perpetuates a stereotype against M.A.D.D. members." Id.
281. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 913.03 (1998); Darbin v. Nourse, 664 F.2d 1109 (9th Cir. 1981).
282. See FLA. STAT. ch. 913.03 (1998), which provides:
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whether the juror possesses the state of mind necessary to render an
impartial verdict.283 The juror's statements that he would be able to fol-
low the law, after making earlier statements that reveal his partiality,
may be insufficient to remove doubt as to the juror's fairness or mental
integrity. 284 The Florida trial court has broad discretion in determining
the existence of a juror's bias,285 and the questioning during voir dire
may be extensive to determine a prospective juror's partiality. 286
A challenge for cause to an individual juror may be made only on the following
grounds:
(1) The juror does not have the qualifications required by law;
(2) The juror is of unsound mind or has a bodily defect that renders him or
her incapable of performing the duties of a juror, except that, in a civil action,
deafness or hearing impairment shall not be the sole basis of a challenge for cause
of an individual juror;
(3) The juror has conscientious beliefs that would preclude him or her from
finding the defendant guilty;
(4) The juror served on a grand jury that found the indictment or a coroner's
jury that inquired into the death of a person whose death is the subject of the
indictment or information;
(5) The juror served on a jury formerly sworn to try the defendant for the
same offense;
(6) The juror served on a jury that tried another person for the offense
charged in the indictment, information, or affidavit;
(7) The juror served as a juror in a civil action brought against the defendant
for the act charged as an offense;
(8) The juror is an adverse party to the defendant in a civil action, or has
complained against or been accused by the defendant in a criminal prosecution;
(9) The juror is related by blood or marriage within the third degree to the
defendant, the attorneys of either party, the person alleged to be injured by the
offense charged, or the person on whose complaint the prosecution was instituted;
(10) The juror has a state of mind regarding the defendant, the case, the person
alleged to have been injured by the offense charged, or the person on whose
complaint the prosecution was instituted that will prevent the juror from acting with
impartiality, but the formation of an opinion or impression regarding the guilt or
innocence of the defendant shall not be a sufficient ground for challenge to a juror if
she declares and the court determines that he or she can render an impartial verdict
according to the evidence;
(11) The juror was a witness for the state or the defendant at the preliminary
hearing or before the grand jury or is to be witness for either party at the trial;
(12) The juror is a surety on the defendant's bail bond in the case.
283. See Akins v. State, 694 So. 2d 847, 849 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997).
284. See Huber v. State, 669 So. 2d 1079, 1082 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (holding that a juror
should have been dismissed for cause when he stated that he believed the police do not arrest
innocent people, even though he eventually said that he would be able to follow the law). Failure
to dismiss a juror for cause when the record reflects that he or she may be biased cannot be
harmless error. See Noe v. State, 586 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991).
285. Irby v. State, 436 So. 2d 1047 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).
286. A federal district judge also has broad discretion in how to conduct the voir dire; he may
reject supplemental questions proposed by counsel if the voir dire is otherwise sufficient to test the
potential jurors for partiality. See United States v. Powell, 932 F.2d 1337, 1340 (9th Cir. 1991).
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Statements that reveal equivocation 287 or racial or ethnic bias288
would justify the challenge of a potential juror for cause. For example, a
prospective juror who stated, "Well, I've lived in Dade County for
thirty-three years, before there was cocaine and drugs and before a lot of
Latin people.., came and took over the area" should have been excused
for cause, even though he stated that he had no personal animosity
toward a Hispanic defendant charged with cocaine trafficking.289
In the example regarding the Ku Klux Klan member, any state-
ments that would show equivocation would be sufficient grounds to
strike him for cause. The wearing of racially discriminatory insignia or a
statement of Klan membership would be a stronger statement of bias
than the equivocal statement above regarding Latin people.290 The ques-
tioning during voir dire that reveals his Klan membership would likely
also produce at least one statement revealing a fixed opinion or equivo-
cation about impartiality. 29I The prospective juror's assurance that he
could remove any prejudice from his mind would not be determinative
of his competence. The trial judge remains free to disregard those state-
ments in light of the juror's other responses during voir dire.292 Any
reasonable doubt concerning the juror's partiality would be grounds for
dismissal for cause.29 3
The problems inherent in establishing non-pretextual justifications
for the use of the peremptory strike have greater force against allowing
287. See Huber, 669 So. 2d at 1082 (finding the trial judge erred in refusing to dismiss a juror
for cause when he stated that he "probably" would be prejudiced, but that he "probably" could
follow the judge's instructions).
288. See Farias v. State, 540 So. 2d 201, 202 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989).
289. Id.
290. See, e.g., Mauldin v. State, 874 S.W.2d 692, 698 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) ("questions such
as those concerning whether members of the venire ... had ever held membership in the Ku Klux
Klan or White Citizen's Council,.. would have given insight into their personal prejudices... and
should have been allowed"); People v. McCray, 443 N.E.2d 915, 918 (N.Y. 1982), cert. den. sub
nom., McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 961 (1983) ("fundamental fairness dictates that a member
of the Ku Klux Klan be disqualified from sitting on a jury in a case in which a black man is
accused of assaulting a white. These individuals can adequately be eliminated through the
challenge for cause.").
291. But see Powell v. State, 297 So. 2d 163, 168 (Ala. Crim. App. 1974), finding that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in qualifying a jury, and that it was not required to ask the
prospective jurors the defendant's proffered questions as to whether any member believed in the
white supremacy of another witness, although the trial court had asked prospective jurors whether
they were members of the Ku Klux Klan and received no responses from the panel. An
elimination of the peremptory should also require judges to allow sufficient questioning during
voir dire to establish grounds for bias, to avoid seating jurors after only perfunctory and
superficial inquiries. The voir dire should be adequate to assure an impartial jury, by enabling the
parties intelligently to exercise their challenges. See Darbin v. Nourse, 664 F.2d 1109, 1113 (9th
Cir. 1981).
292. See Akins v. State, 694 So. 2d 847, 849 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997).
293. See id. at 848.
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an expansion of the challenge for cause. A broadened strike for cause
could still result in discrimination because courts would be unwilling to
second-guess justifications listed as presumptively nondiscriminatory
under new guidelines (e.g. organizational membership). Such guidelines
could be virtual "how-to guides" for prejudicially striking jurors who do
not meet objective criteria for bias. Any use of judicial discretion in
determining the genuineness of such broadened strikes for cause essen-
tially would reproduce the current, post-Batson use of the peremptory
challenge.
2. RETURN TO THE PRE-BATSON CHALLENGE
Another proposal by critics of the current peremptory challenge is
to revert to the pre-Batson challenge.294 Proponents argue that the his-
torical challenge will be a safeguard for the removal of jurors when a
challenge for cause is unsuccessful because it gives parties some control
over the jury's composition, and it would apply equally to all prospec-
tive jurors.295 The third rationale was used in Swain v. Alabama,296
however, and is unlikely to be successful in light of the Supreme Court's
recognition that past discriminatory practices prevented an even-handed
application of the historical peremptory challenge.297  The fact that
courts currently continue to find that peremptories are being used in a
discriminatory fashion also works against a return to the original pre-
Batson system.
3. ABOLrrION OF THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE
The complex inquiry, administrative difficulties, and confusion in
the post-Batson case law effectively have abolished the peremptory chal-
lenge in its original form. An elimination of the peremptory would pre-
vent conscious and unconscious discrimination in the jury selection
process, and would promote a greater perception of integrity in the judi-
298cial process.
The protections afforded by the "fair cross section" requirement
under the Sixth Amendment 299 also support an abolition of the chal-
294. See Beck, supra note 49, at 997-98.
295. Id. at 998.
296. 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965).
297. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986).
298. See supra text accompanying note 272.
299. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 527 (1975) (ruling that criminal defendants have a
right, under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, to a jury drawn from a "fair cross section of
the community"); Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979). The fair cross section requirement
was established as a method to secure the defendant's right to an impartial jury under the Sixth
Amendment, by preventing the systematic disqualification or exemption of particular groups, such
as women, from jury service. See Taylor, 419 U.S. at 526-31.
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lenge. Under this requirement, a criminal defendant has a right to a panel
selected from a group of citizens who represent a fair cross-section of
the community. 3" Current venire selection mechanisms are designed to
summon prospective jurors who are representative of the broad commu-
nity,3"' and the elimination of the peremptory as a potentially discrimi-
natory mechanism for group exclusion would widen the probability of a
diverse sample in the petit jury.3 °2
The Supreme Court in Holland v. Illinois3 03 addressed the relation-
ship between the "fair cross section" requirement and the Equal Protec-
tion Clause when a litigant's use of the peremptory results in eliminating
distinctive groups from the petit jury. In Holland, a white defendant
alleged that the prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to strike the
only two African-American venire members from the petit jury, thereby
violating his Sixth Amendment right to a fair cross-section of the com-
munity.3" The Court held that the defendant's right to a fair cross-sec-
tion did not extend from the venire to the petit jury because there is no
requirement under the Sixth Amendment that petit juries must mirror the
distinctive groups in the population.3 °5 The Court stated, "[D]efendants
are not entitled to a jury of any particular composition"30 6 because the
Sixth Amendment fair cross-section requirement is "a means of assur-
ing, not a representative jury (which the Constitution does not demand),
but an impartial one (which it does). 30 7 The Court added that the
attainment of an impartial jury "impliedly compels peremptory chal-
lenges, but in no way could it be interpreted directly or indirectly to
prohibit them. 30 8
300. See Duren, 439 U.S. at 364 ("[Iln order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair
cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a
"distinctive" group in the community; (2)that the representation of this group in venires from
which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the
community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the
jury-selection process.").
301. See, e.g., The Federal Jury Selection Act of 1969, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1863(b)(2), 1865 (1998)
(requiring that federal venires be randomly drawn from voter registration lists or lists of actual
voters, and setting forth the statutory disqualifications from federal jury service).
302. Peremptories currently still often result in the elimination of minority venirepersons from
the petit jury, because many minorities who receive the jury summons report to the courthouse at a
lower rate, and can be eliminated through race-neutral explanations for the strike. See Adams &
Lane, supra note 265, at 705. Therefore, "[a]though intended to remedy the striking of minority
venirepersons for racial reasons, the Supreme Court's holding in Batson v. Kentucky has failed to
deter the practice effectively." Id. at 706 (footnotes omitted).
303. 493 U.S. 474, 480-84 (1990).
304. Id. at 476.
305. Id. at 474.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 480.
308. Id. at 482.
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The Court based its decision upon the assumption that the peremp-
tory challenge furthers the goal of impartiality by eliminating "extremes
of partiality on both sides"3" so that a neutral or impartial jury will
result. The Sixth Amendment goal of attaining an impartial jury would
only "compel" the peremptory if it were in fact successful in identifying
biased jurors. However, as discussed earlier, studies of jurors' delibera-
tions have shown that they tend to decide cases based upon the evidence,
and attorneys are unsuccessful in predicting jurors' partiality.31°
The challenge for cause is the only mechanism that demonstrably
establishes a potential juror's bias, and it is currently the only sufficient
method to ensure the elimination of unfavorable jurors. The reality of
practice, based upon the historical use of the challenge, has in fact estab-
lished its efficacy as a tool for discrimination sanctioned by the judicial
process. The current, post-Batson protections have been insufficient to
eliminate this discrimination because attorneys can effectively cloak
their bias with neutral but disingenuous justifications.
Ironically, the "fair cross section" requirement preserves the
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury by assuming
that diverse groups bring different perspectives and, therefore, "balance"
the jury's perspective as a whole. 3 1' The Batson inquiry, in contrast,
presumes that jurors will not decide the evidence in a racially biased
manner. 3 2 This conflict can be resolved by assuming that jurors' cul-
tural perspectives allow them to view evidence in different ways, with-
out presuming an ethnic or racial bias in their decisions. 3 3 The striking
of any group of jurors through the peremptory therefore increases the
probability that diverse viewpoints reflecting the broad community will
be eliminated.314
309. Id. at 484 (quoting Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965)).
310. See supra Part V.A.
311. See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 175 (1986), where the court noted,
The wholesale exclusion of . . .large groups from jury service ... for reasons
completely unrelated to the ability of members of the group to serve as jurors in a
particular case, . . . raised at least the possibility that the composition of juries would
be arbitrarily skewed in such a way as to deny criminal defendants the benefit of the
common-sense judgment of the community.
312. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, where the court stated,
[J]ust as the Equal Protection Clause forbids the States to exclude black persons
from the venire on the assumption that blacks as a group are unqualified to serve as
jurors ... so it forbids the States to strike black veniremen on the assumption that
they will be biased in a particular case simply because the defendant is black. The
core guarantee of equal protection.., would be meaningless were we to approve the
exclusion of jurors on the basis of such assumptions.
313. See supra note 270 and accompanying text.
314. Compare Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 178-79, where the Court stated,
[I]f it were true that the Constitution required a certain mix of individual viewpoints
on the jury, then trial judges would be required to undertake the Sisyphean task of
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Trial judges often can avoid an in-depth scrutiny of venirepersons
for bias because they can rely on the attorneys' use of peremptories to
act as a back-up method for striking jurors.31 An elimination of the
peremptory would require judges and attorneys to probe more thor-
oughly into whether veniremembers' statements could support a chal-
lenge for cause. This inquiry would not be unduly burdensome, in light
of the inquiry already necessary to establish support for a non-pretextual
explanation for a peremptory. The basis of the challenge for cause also
is objectively demonstrable, unlike the basis for the peremptory.
An improper use of the peremptory results not only in unconstitu-
tionally discriminating against the party and the juror, but also in under-
mining the integrity of the judicial process. The litigant runs the risk of
reversal and a new trial if he improperly establishes the basis for the
strike. This risk can be high in light of the discrepancies between courts
in accepting particular justifications as legitimate. The benefit to parties
of allowing the peremptory is therefore low in comparison to the risk to
potential jurors' constitutional rights to participate and retain confidence
in the jury system. An elimination of the peremptory challenge would
broaden the jury base without significant adverse consequences, because
the challenge for cause already allows the removal of demonstrably
biased potential jurors.
VI. CONCLUSION
The historical peremptory challenge has vanished and its current
version, the nondiscriminatory challenge, has become increasingly com-
plex, resulting in an increasing amount of criticism. Although attorneys
generally like using peremptory challenges because they appear to pro-
vide greater control over the jury selection process, this control is illu-
sory. The benefit of the current challenge-the selection of an unbiased
'balancing' juries, making sure that each contains the proper number of Democrats
and Republicans, young persons and old persons, white-collar executives and blue-
collar laborers, and so on. Adopting McCree's concept of jury impartiality would
also likely require the elimination of peremptory challenges, which are commonly
used by both the State and the defendant to attempt to produce a jury favorable to
the challenger.
It is impractical to assert that the Sixth Amendment fair cross-section requirement, as currently
applied to distinctive groups, should be attained in the petit jury, as the for-cause challenge neces-
sitates the dismissal of biased viewpoints which, if eliminated, could result in disproportionate
representation in the petit jury. The peremptory, however, operates as a discriminatory mechanism
to dismiss jurors who have already passed muster after the challenges for cause. It therefore can
only serve to eliminate individual viewpoints that add diversity to the final jury, as its ability to
successfully target bias is questionable at best.
315. See Melilli, supra note 9, at 486.
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jury-has not been substantiated and the risks of its unconstitutional
application, including subsequent reversal and a new trial, are high.
The current peremptory challenge, as a method of preventing the
discriminatory exclusion of particular groups from the petit jury, is seri-
ously flawed. Knowledgeable practitioners can mask discriminatory
motives through plausible justifications, which courts may be reluctant
to second-guess. Litigants also run the risk of having legitimate justifica-
tions disallowed because the composition of the jury pool could raise a
false inference of discrimination. Courts currently struggle with separat-
ing plausible, legitimate justifications from plausible, but pretextual
explanations for the strike, resulting in contradictory and illogical deci-
sions. These decisions obscure the nondiscriminatory use of the chal-
lenge and turn voir dire into a lengthy process, where counsel attempt to
determine which jurors' habits could substantiate their guesses as to
bias. The challenge thus undermines jurors' confidence in the integrity
of the judicial process, as they see veniremen stricken for stereotypical
reasons without a demonstration of actual bias.
The challenge, as currently used, is practically unworkable and
should be eliminated. Any other alternative, such as establishing a
"quasi-cause" challenge, would continue the confusion and the mini-tri-
als that exist from the use of the post-Batson challenge. Eliminating the
peremptory challenge would reduce the expense of jury research and
profiling, and would continue the trend which Batson and its progeny set
into motion.
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